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THE PRACTICAL LOCATION OF BOUNDARIES

Olin L. Browder, Jr.*

E

in the development of the common law of conveyancing, as everyone knows, the practice of physically consummating a conveyance by acts on the land itself was abandoned in
favor of the more flexible and convenient devices authorized or
required by the Statute of Uses and the Statute of Frauds. Now we
do it all on paper and consummate the transaction at any convenient place. One of the requirements of this process is to make clear
what land is being conveyed. So we describe the land on paper in
one of the several ways which have been approved for this purpose. The courts, with admirable liberality, have not specified
that any particular sort of description is required, but only that
it shall be possible, in some lawsuit brought for the purpose,
for a court to decide, from the language used and perhaps from
certain other extrinsic matter, just where the land described
is located. But these more civilized refinements may have lost
something of value which was of the essence of the cruder
feoffment. And thereby hangs a tale which, by your leave, I
mean to tell in this space.
The rub comes in the unquestioned assumption that when you
have done what is mentioned above you have done all that needs
to be done for the expeditious, peaceable, and conclusive transaction of this sort of business. A paper description will be enough,
to be sure, to tell you in a general way where your land lies.
But anyone at all familiar with litigation over boundaries will
know that, for a variety of reasons, few if any of these descriptions admit of a single and precise application to the ground. It
is this hiatus in our conveyancing practice between a deed describing land and the actual location on the ground of the boundaries described which causes most of our trouble over boundaries.
ARLY
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How is this gap to be bridged? The proper time to bridge it
is at the time of a conveyance. But under existing practices this
is rarely done. What, then, is the situation of adjoining landowners whose respective deeds are consistent on paper? Either
they are left without precise knowledge of their boundaries or,
what is worse, their only way to a certain resolution of their
doubts is by means of litigation. And even this may not be conclusive, but only the substitution of a paper decree for a paper
description, leaving the gap still unbridged. All that such parties
usually want is to know their boundaries, and at the beginning
of their inquiry they are usually amicably inclined. Someone
may tell them to have their lands surveyed, but of course this
alone settles nothing. They do not want to quarrel about it,
but we must tell them that if they want to be sure, they must
begin a long and costly process which, if they are not quarreling
at the beginning, will leave them quarreling at the end. If the
consequences of these conditions have not been as deplorable
as might be expected, the explanation no doubt lies in the fact
that most people live out their lives not knowing their precise
boundaries and not caring. But there are times when a matter
of inches or of feet becomes a matter of some importance, which
is usually when one of the parties proposes to make some improvement of his property.
In certain long-settled areas boundary troubles are rare. So
it is in England, which may be explained in part by the fact that
most land-holdings are marked by fences, hedges, or walls of long
standing and acceptance as boundaries. Much of our country,
on the other hand, has not yet reached such a stabilized condition,
and the continuing processes of subdivision in a rapidly growing
society have sorely aggravated the problems inherent in our
system of conveyancing.
It is not surprising that under the circumstances mentioned
parties will try to take their boundary problems into their own
hands. Nor is it surprising that the American courts have been
disposed to give legal sanction to such private arrangements in
the furtherance of a declared policy of quieting peaceable possession a·.1d discouraging litigation.
A traditional method for accomplishing such an objective is
the doctrine of adverse possession. But the courts have not been
willing to confine adjoining landowners to that doctrine. They
have sought rather to evolve some principle which would bind
such parties to a private, mutual designation of a boundary on
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the ground so as to preclude any further question over its proper
location. Not fully recognizing that the problem is probably
sui generis, the courts have sought to adapt to their purpose several disparate existing doctrines. This has led to disagreement
and misunderstanding of the nature of the problem or the legal
theory or theories which would -adequately explain or support
judicial action. Vagueness of theory has led in turn to vagueness
and disagreement on the facts which will merit judicial recognition. The result has been the growth of a gnarled and hoary knot
upon this branch of the law of property. One who seeks to work
his way into the core is tempted simply to lay bare a crosssection of the mass for the exercise of students of legal method.
But after more than a century of judicial groping through
upwards of a thousand cases, without the benefit of any comprehensive legal scholarship beyond that which the courts themselves could afford, it is high time that someone attempted a survey of the cases, together with some definitive legal analysis.
The reader should know that, in my effort to do this in an article
of acceptable extent, it has been necessary to skim off for the
footnotes only a small illustrative fraction of the mass of cases.
He should be warned further of the dangers of deception inherent in such an undertaking. At this time I am able merely
to spread before him the various solutions which have been
offered to the problem, some of their ramifications, and some
comment upon them. It will not do to assume that the cases cited
represent the law in any of the respective jurisdictions, for in
many of them other cases can be found which qualify or are inconsistent with those cited. This suggests that any adequate
appraisal of this law for the benefit of practitioners should
include a survey of the cases on a state-by-state basis. Such a survey cannot be made at this time.
No examination of the law of adverse possession in relation
to boundary problems will be made, except to the extent required for an adequate analysis of other related doctrine. Nor
is it necessary to do more than mention the undisputed recognition of the practical location of boundaries as evidence of their
proper location where the applicable description is ambiguous.1
The term "practical location" is used in this discussion as a

lE.g., Day v. Stenger, 47 Idaho 253,274 P. 112 (1929); Mt. Carmel v. McCiintock, 155
Ill. 608, 40 N.E. 829 (1895); Magoon v. Davis, 84 Me. 178, 24 A. 809 (1892); Lovejoy
v. Lovett, 124 Mass. 270 (1878); Lundgreen v. Stratton, 73 Wis. 659, 41 N.W. 1012 (1889).
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generic term to refer to the several rules, other than adverse
possession, which have been announced for the determination
of boundaries on the ground.
I.

PAROL AGREEMENT

It has been recognized by a majority of American courts that
the determination of a boundary by what is called an oral "agreement" between adjoining landowners will, according to various
standards, become binding on them,2 and perhaps also on their
successors in interest.3 The most obvious and orthodox example
of this is the settlement of a boundary dispute by an agreement
in the nature of an arbitration agreement. Evidently, however,
not much use has been made of this device. It presupposes the
compromise of a dispute and an express or implied agreement to
be bound by the award,4 which in these cases will probably take
the form of a designation of the boundary on the ground by
the person chosen for this purpose. Some arbitration agreements
2 Arkansas: Havlik v. Freeman, 214 Ark. 761, 218 S.W. (2d) 364 (1949); California:
Young v. Blakeman, 153 Cal. 477, 95 P. 888 (1908); Connecticut: Rathbun v. Geer, 64 Conn.
421, 30 A. 60 (1894); Delaware: Lindsay v. Springer, 4 Harr. (Del. Super.) 547 (1848);
Florida: Watrous v. Morrison, 33 Fla. 261, 14 S. 805 (1894); Georgia: Bunger v. Grimm,
142 Ga. 448, 83 S.E. 200 (1914); Idaho: Paurley v. Harris, 75 Idaho 112, 268 P. (2d) 351
(1954); Illinois: Ginther v. Duginger, 6 Ill. (2d) 474, 129 N:E. (2d) 147 (1955); Indiana:
Horton v. Brown, 130 Ind. 113, 29 N.E. 414 (1891); Iowa: Kitchen v. Chantland, 130 Iowa
618, 105 N.W. 367 (1906); Kansas: Steinhilber v. Holmes, 68 Kan. 607, 75 P. 1019 (1904);
Kentucky: Garvin v. Threlkeld, 173 Ky. 262, 190 S.W. 1092 (1917); Louisiana: Griffin v.
Mahoney, (La. App. 1951) 56 S.W. (2d) 208; Michigan: Hanlon v. Ten Hove, 235 Mich.
227, 209 N.W. 169 (1926); Minnesota: Beardsley v. Crane, 52 -Minn. 537, 54 N.W. 740
(1893); Mississippi: Archer v. Helm, 69 Miss. 730, 11 S. 3 (1892); Missouri: Journey v.
Vikturek, 8 S.W. (2d) 975 (1928); Montana: Box Elder Livestock Co. v. Glynn, 58 Mont.
561, 193 P. 1117 (1920); Nebraska: Lynch v. Egan, 67 Neb. 541, 93 N.W. 775 (1903); New
Hampshire: Gray v. Berry, 9 N.H. 473 (1838); New Mexico: Rodriguez v. La Cueva Ranch
Co., 17 N.M. 246, 134 P. 228 (1912); New York: Vosburgh v. Teator, 32 N.Y. 561 (1865};
North Dakota: Bichler v. Ternes, 63 N.D. 295, 248 N.W. 185 (1933); Ohio: Bobo v. Richmond, 25 Ohio St. 115 (1874); Oregon: Lennox v. Hendricks, 11 Ore. 33, 4 P. 515 (1883);
Pennsylvania: Perkins v. Gay, 3 Serg. & R. (Pa.) •327 (1817); Rhode Island: Aldrich v.
Brownell, 45 R.I. 142, 120 A. 582 (1923); South Carolina: Davis v. Elmore, 40 S.C. 533, 19
S.E. 204 (1893); Tennessee: Houston v. Matthews, 9 Tenn. 116 (1826); Texas: Bailey v.
Baker, (Tex. Civ. App. 1893) 23 S.W. 454; Utah: Warren v. Mazzuchi, 45 Utah 612,
148 P. 360 (1915); Vermont: Burnell v. Maloney, 39 Vt. 579 (1867); Washington:
Egleski v. Strozyk, 121 Wash. 398, 209 P. 708 (1922); West Virginia: Gwynn v.
Schwartz, 32 W. Va. 487, 9 S.E. 880 (1889); Wisconsin: Peters v. Reichenbach, 114 Wis.
209, 90 N.W. 184 (1902). See dicta, South Dakota: Wood v. Bapp, 41 S.D. 195 at 209, 169
N.W. 518 (1918); Wyoming: Carstensen v. Brown, 32 Wyo. 491 at 500, 236 P. 517 (1925).
In the following cases the acceptability of boundary agreements is not made entirely clear:
Maine: Bemis v. Bradley, 126 Me. 462, 139 A. 593 (1927); Oklahoma: Lake v. Crosser,
202 Okla. 582, 216 P. (2d) 583 (1950).
3 See Part V, "Status of Subsequent Purchasers" infra.
~Pionke v. Washburn, 176 Wis. 417, 186 N.W. 1012 (1922).
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which have been upheld have been in writing.5 In Massachusetts,
where the submission was to referees under a rule of court, the
awards were held binding, 6 but otherwise an oral submission was
not binding.7 Although there is other authority to the same
effect,8 oral submissions have been upheld. 9 It is said that the
Statute of Frauds is not a bar because the undertaking does not
create new rights, but only establishes existing ones.10
The great mass of judicially enforced boundary agreements,
however, have not involved anything like a submission to arbitration. It is the conduct of the parties themselves, rather than that
of an arbitrator, which fixes the boundary. The nature and circumstances of such agreements are without exact parallel or
clear analogy elsewhere in the law. The requirements which
the courts have laid down for them relate, for the most part,
either to the pre-existing conditions out of which an agreement
can be made or to the acts which must follow the agreement
if it is to affect a boundary. Very little has been said about what
facts will constitute the agreement itself.

The Requirement of Uncertainty
It is a universally accepted requirement that no binding
agreement can be made unless it is made to resolve an "uncertainty" regarding the location of a boundary. This requirement is variously phrased in terms of the boundary being uncertain, unascertained, unsettled, doubtful, indefinite, or that
there is an "honest difficulty" 11 or "room for controversy." 12
But what or who must be uncertain? Is the reference made to
an objective state of facts or to the state of mind of the parties?
Acceptance of the former criterion is indicated by statements

5 Forguson v. Newton, 212 Ky. 92, 278 S.W. 602 (1925); Gaylord v. Gaylord, 48 N.C.
367 (1856); Rottman v. Toft, 187 Wis. 558, 204 N.W. 585 (1925). Cf. Wilson v. Stork, 171
Wis. 561, 177 N.W. 878 (1920), which seems to hold that a mistake in the survey vitiates
its effect.
6 Searle v. Abbe, 79 Mass. 409 (1859); Goodridge v. Dustin, 46 Mass. 363 (1842).
7 Whitney v. Holmes, 15 Mass. 152 (1818).
s Camp v. Camp, 59 Vt. 667 (1887).
9 Smith v. Seitz, 87 Conn. 678, 89 A. 257 (1914); Jones v. Dewey, 17 N.H. 596 (1845);
Bowen v. Cooper, 7 Watts (47 Pa.) 311 (1838). The following were arbitration cases in
fact, although the courts did not treat them strictly on that basis: Box Elder Livestock
Co. v. Glynn, 58 Mont. 561, 193 P. 1117 (1920); Vosburgh v. Teator, 32 N.Y. 561 (1865).
10 Smith v. Seitz, 87 Conn. 678, 89 A. 257 (1914).
11 Smith v. Hamilton, 20 Mich. 433 (1870).
12 Shiver v. Hill, 148 Ga. 616, 97 S.E. 676 (1918).
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that a boundary is certain which can be made certain,13 or is
readily ascertainable, 14 or that the requirement is not met if
the parties made no effort to find the line; 15 or, if a line is marked
on the ground, mere doubt about it is not enough. 16 .One court
said that a line is not uncertain merely because it had never been
run. 17 Another even seems to require that the uncertainty must
appear from the face of a deed or from an attempt by survey to
apply the description to the ground. 18 These courts are not conscious of the illusory nature of an objective standard of uncertainty where a boundary has not been judicially established.
Other courts are equally insistent that the requirement is met
even though the line is alleged to be readily ascertainable,19 or
because its ascertainment would entail considerable trouble and
expense.20 One court recently said that the requirement is merely
that the parties not know where the true line is.21 In the great
majority of the cases the requirement is merely stated in terms
of one or more of the various labels, with perhaps a finding that
the requirement was satisfied in the particular case, but without
any effort to explain what is meant by it.22
There is some indication that the uncertainty requirement
is imposed to supply consideration for a boundary agreement. As
in the case of an agreement for arbitration, consideration exists
where there is a dispute about a boundary which the agreement is
intended to resolve. Indeed there are a few cases which indicate
that nothing less than a dispute will suffice to support a boundary agreement. 23

13 Meacci
14 Cienki

v. Kochergen, 141 Cal. App. (2d) 207, 296 P. (2d) 573 (1956).
v. Rusnak, 398 Ill. 77, 75 N.'E. (2d) 372 (1947); George v. Collins, 72 W. Va.
25, 77 S.E. 356 (1913).
15 Skinner v. Francisco, 404 Ill. 356, 88 N.E. (2d) 867 (1949); Lennox v. Hendricks,
11 Ore. 33, 4 P. 515 (1883).
16 Lewallen v. Overton, 28 Tenn. 76 (1848).
17 Burnell v. Maloney, 39 Vt. 579 (1867).
18 Elofrson v. Lindsay, 90 Wis. 203, 63 N.W. 89 (1895); Hartung v. Witte, 59 Wis.
285, 18 N.W. 175 (1884).
19 Galbraith v. Lunsford, 87 Tenn. 89 (1888); Harn v. Smith, 79 Tex. 310, 15 S.W.
240 (1891); Willie v. Local Realty Co., 110 Utah 523, 175 P. (2d) 718 (1946).
20 Lynch v. Egan, 67 Neb. 541, 93 N.W. 775 (1903).
21 Madera School District v. Maggiorini, 146 Cal. App. (2d) 390, 303 P. (2d) 803 (1956).
Cf. Hunt v. Devling, 8 Watts (48 Pa.) 403 (1839).
22 Cf. K.laar v. Lemperis, (Mo. 1957) 303 S.W. (2d) 55, where the court said that the
parties were not uncertain, and the only doubt was in the mind of a prospective purchaser
from one of them.
23 Brock v. Muse, 232 Ky. 293, 22 S.W. (2d) 1034 (1929); De Long v. Baldwin, 111
Mich. 466, 69 N.W. 831 (1897); Le Comte v. Freshwater, 56 W. Va. 336, 49 S.E. 238 (1904);
Hartung v. Witte, 59 Wis. 285, 18 N.W. 175 (1884).
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Most courts, however, seem to be more concerned with the
requirements of the Statute of Frauds than the need for consideration. There is no appreciable authority for allowing adjoining
landowners to adjust or alter their boundaries by oral agreement.
It is generally agreed, therefore, that if the parties, or one of
them, "know" where the true line is,24 or, not knowing, they
know that their agreed line is not the true line,25 their agreement
is not valid. 26 A disputed boundary, on the other hand, can be
the basis for a valid agreement, by analogy to an arbitration
agreement, which, as indicated above, is not regarded as constituting a conveyance of any land. In like manner, most courts
are willing to uphold an agreement which does not resolve a
boundary dispute, provided that it does resolve a pre-existing
uncertainty about a boundary. But any arrangement between
the parties which has the effect of fixing a line different from
that which a proper application of their title papers would require is in a sense an informal transfer of land. What is the ultimate test for distinguishing between a transaction which falls
under the Statute of Frauds and one which the courts will sustain as a boundary agreement? No clear definition of the present
requirement will be possible until a clearer picture emerges of
the nature of this unusual sort of transaction, and until the pervading effects of what may be called the "mistake rule" have
been examined.

Post-Agreement Requirements
Most of the courts which recognize boundary agreements insist that certain circumstances must exist following an agreement
before it can be regarded as binding, or determinative of the
boundary. But the courts are not agreed on the nature of such
circumstances, and they are vague about the reasons for requiring

24. Lewis v. Ogram, 149 Cal. 505, 87 P. 60 (1906); Smith v. Lanier, 199 Ga. 255, 34
S.E. (2d) 91 (1945); Kunkle v. Clinkingbeard, 66 Idaho 493, 162 P. (2d) 892 (1945); Wright
v. Hendricks, 388 Ill. 431, 58 N.E. (2d) 453 (1944); Peterson v. Hollis, 90 Kan. 655, 136
P. 258 (1913); ·Duff v. Turner, 201 Ky. 501, 256 S.W. 1105 (1923); Thoman v. Gross, 148
Mich. 505, 112 N.W. Ill (1907); Volkart v. Groom, (Mo. 1928) 9 S.W. (2d) 947. Contra:
Tate v. Foshee, 117 Ind. 322, 20 N.E. 241 (1889). Cf. Gray v. Berry, 9 N.H. 473 (1838),
where a second agreement was allowed to supersede a prior agreement.
25 Loverkamp v. Loverkamp, 381 Ill. 467, 45 N.E. (2d) 871 (1942); Voigt v. Hunt,
(Tex. Civ. App. 1914) 167 S.W. 745.
26 Contra: Bobo v. Richmond, 25 Ohio St. 115 (1874). See Stutsman v. State, 67 N.D.
618 at 624, 275 N.W. 387 (1937). But note that the Ohio court requires acquiescence for
the statutory period after an agreement. In the Bobo case it was indicated that the
result was one of estoppel.
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them. In several cases it is indicated, but not beyond doubt, that
such an agreement is binding when made. 27 A number of courts
have held that such agreements are binding if "executed" by
physical manifestations of the agreement on the ground.28 Execution will often take place by the erection of a fence, but other
acts, including a change of possession, will suffice. A still larger
body of authority requires that the agreement be followed by
acquiescence in it or possession consistent with it for an undefined
period of time which, however, may be less than the period of
the statute of limitations for adverse possession.29 At the other
end of the spectrum are the views of the Ohio30 and possibly
the Washington31 courts that a boundary agreement becomes binding only after acquiescence in it for the statutory period; or the
position of the Wisconsin court, asserting a special sort of estoppel
and requiring that valuable improvements be made in reliance
on the agreement.32 Account should be taken of the blurring effect
of other cases, if the emphasis is placed on the facts of those cases
rather than on the language of the courts. Cases which state no
requirement of acquiescence, for example, or permit acquiescence
for less than the statutory period, may show in fact that there was

27 Davis v. 'Elmore, 40 S.C. 533, 19 S.E. 204 (1893); Houston v. Matthews, 9 Tenn.
116 (1826). Cf. Wilson v. Hudson, 16 Tenn. 398 (1835); Davis v. Jones, 40 Tenn. 603 (1859).
28Lindsay v. Springer, 4 Harr. (Del. Super.) 547 (1848); Bunger v. Grimm, 142
Ga. 448, 83 S.E. 200 (1914); Tate v. Foshee, 117 Ind. 332, 20 N.E. 241 (1889); Garvin v.
T•hrelkeld, 173 Ky. 262, 190 S.W. 1092 (1917); Journey v. Vikturek, (Mo. 1928) 8 S.W.
(2d) 975; Lynch v. Egan, 67 Neb. 541, 93 N.W. 775 (1903); Gray v. iBerry, 9 N.H. 473
(1838); Bowen v. Cooper, 7 Watts (47 Pa.) 311 (1838); Aldrich v. Brownell, 45 R.I. 142,
120 A. 582 (1923); Bailey v. Baker, (Tex. Civ. App. 1893) 23 S.W. 454; Gwynn v. Schwartz,
32 W. Va. 487, 9 S.E. 880 (1889). Archer v. Helm, 69 Miss. 730, 11 S. 3 (1892), may be in
accord, but it is not clear whether the agreement is executed upon taking possession, or
whether such possession must continue for some period.
29 Havlik v. Freeman, 214 Ark. 761, 218 S.W. (2d) 364 (1949); Watrous v. Morrison,
33 Fla. 261, 14 S. 805 (1894); Paurley v. Harris, 75 Idaho 112, 268 P. (2d) 351 (1954);
Ginther v. Duginger, 6 Ill. (2d) 474, 129 N.E. (2d) 147 (1955); Kitchen v. Chantland,
130 Iowa 618, 105 N.W. 367 (1906); Steinhilber v. Holmes, 68 Ran. 607, 75 P. 1019 (1904);
Griffin v. Mahoney, (La. App. 1951) 56 S. (2d) 208; Hanlon v. Ten Hove, 235 Mich. 227,
209 N.W. 169 (1926); Beardsley v. Crane, 52 Minn. 537, 54 N.W. 740 (1893); Box Elder
Livestock Co. v. Glynn, 58 Mont. 561, 193 P. 1117 (1920); Rodriguez v. La Cueva Ranch
Co., 17 N.M. 246, 134 P. 228 (1912); Bichler v. Ternes, 63 N.D. 295, 248 N.W. 185 (1933);
Lake v. Crosser, 202 Okla. 582, 216 P. (2d) 583 (1950); Lennox v. Hendricks, 11 Ore. 33,
4 P. 515 (1883). See Wood v. Bapp, 41 S.D. 195 at 210, 169 N.W. 518 (1918). The following
may be to the same effect, although the courts have not made themselves entirely clear
on the point: Cavanaugh v. Jackson, 91 Cal. 580, 27 P. 931 (1891); Knowles v. Toothaker,
58 Me. 172 (1870); Vosburgh v. Teator, 32 N.Y. 561 (1865); Carstensen v. Brown, 32 Wyo.
491, 236 P. 517 (1925). Cf. Loustalot v. McKee!, 157 Cal. 634, 108 P. 707 (1910).
30 Bobo v. Richmond, 25 Ohio St. 115 (1874).
31 Egleski v. Strozyk, 121 Wash. 398, 209 P. 708 (1922).
32 Peters ".· Reichenbach, 114 Wis. 209, 90 N.W. 184 (1902).
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acquiescence for the statutory period or substantial changes of
position.33
It is odd that several courts have indicated that a boundary
agreement which becomes binding when "executed" may later
be abrogated by abandonment34 or by a later agreement.35
A few courts have not yet indicated what post-agreement requirements will be imposed.36 There is almost a total lack of
explanation for imposing one such requirement rather than another, or for imposing such a requirement at all.

The Nature and Theory of Boundary Agreements
The courts have prescribed certain pre-existing conditions for
such agreements, as well as certain post-agreement requirements,
but there is a general vagueness in the opinions about just what
it is that takes place when such an agreement is made. In those
few cases where the agreement is essentially one of arbitration,
its essential features are obvious. But most of these transactions
are not contractual in the sense of involving anything that is
executory or promissory. The agreement, rather than looking to
the future, refers to an existing fact, a line somehow designated
on the ground, and amounts to a recognition or acceptance of
that line as a boundary. Commonly such assent follows a survey,
which is strikingly different from the arbitration-type of agreement, which calls for a survey or other factual determination in
the future. But a survey is nowhere imposed as a requirement,
and less formal or reliable bases for agreement are to be found
in the cases. There is indeed some conflict, as indicated in the
discussion of the uncertainty requirement, on whether the parties
need make any effort to ascertain their true boundary.
Commonly the required acceptance of or assent to a line on
the ground is manifested by express verbal statements by the
parties. We are rarely told just what was said, but merely that
the parties "agreed." There is nothing to indicate that this must
ss Watrous v. Morrison, 33 Fla. 261, 14 S. 805 (1894); Kitchen v. Chantland, 130
Iowa 618, 105 N.W. 367 (1906); McBeth v. White, 122 Kan. 637, 253 P. 212 (1927); Shafer
v. Leigh, 112 Kan. 14, 209 P. 830 (1922); Rodriguez v. La Cueva Ranch Co., 17 N.M.
246, 134 P. 228 (1912); Aldrich v. Brownell, 45 R.I. 142, 120 A. 582 (1923).
84Brummell v. Harris, 162 Mo. 397, 63 S.W. 497 (1901); Kellum v. Smith, 65 Pa.
86 (1870).
SIS Gray v. Berry, 9 N.H. 473 (1838).
86 Horton v. Brown, 130 Ind. ll3, 29 N.E. 414 (1891); J3emis v. Bradley, 126 Me.
462, 139 A. 593 (1927); Warren v. Mazzuchi, 45 Utah 612, 148 P. 360 (1915); Burnell v.
Maloney, 39 Vt. 579 (1867).
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be done in any particular way or at any particular time or place,
or that it must be done by one party in the other's presence, or
that they must do it at the same time. Clearly mutuality of assent
or recognition will be insisted on. 37
The necessary assent which is called an agreement may be
manifested by conduct as well as by words. 38 In fact it is seldom
that one will find parties standing on their respective parcels and,
in something of the manner of a feoffment, solemnly declaring in
each other's presence that they thereby accept a line on the
ground as a boundary. Boundary agreements grow out of the
innumerable combinations of speech and conduct to be found
when parties confer or do the various acts which neighbors often
do in respect to their common boundary. Such circumstances may
fairly bristle with implications of intention, and it is inevitable
that courts will draw inferences, or allow juries to do so, for or
against the existence of an agreement. Some of the more common
acts are equivocal in their significance. Such is the erection of
fences or similar barriers. Since these may be built for reasons
other than to mark boundaries, evidence of such other purpose
will defeat an inference of agreement. 39 So also may evidence
that one or both of the parties understood that the agreement was
to be provisional or conditional on the existence or occurrence
of some other fact. 40 Although the question has not been specifically ruled on, presumably the intention behind such equivocal
acts can be proved by testimony of the parties in a lawsuit over
the validity of the agreement.
Because of the legal effect given to these agreements, an
obvious requirement is imposed that an agreement can affect
only a common boundary between parcels owned by the parties.41
37 Gregory v. Jones, 212 Ark. 443, 206 S.W. (2d) 18 (1947). Cf. Tietjen v. Dobson,
170 Ga. 123, 152 S.E. 222 (1930), where, although the initial agreement was mutual the
erection of a fence as required to execute it was done by one party without the knowledge
of the other.
38Ernsting v. Gleason, 137 Mo. 594, 39 S.W. 70 (1897); Bernier v. Preckel, 60 N.D.
549, 236 N.W. 243 (1931); Pickett v. Nelson, 71 Wis. 542, 37 N.W. 836 (1888); Carstensen
v. Brown, 32 Wyo. 491, 236 IP. 517 (1925).
89 Ackerman v. Ryder, 308 Mo. 9, 271 S.W. 743 (1925); Satchell v. :Dunsmoor, 179
Ore. 463, 172 P. (2d) 826 (1946); Ungaro v. Mete, 68 R.I. 419, 27 A. (2d) 826 (1942);
Lacy v. Bartlett, (Tex. Civ. App. 1934) 78 S.W. (2d) 219; Wood v. Webb, 148 Wash. 161,
268 P. 150 (1928).
40 Oliver v. Daniel, 202 Ga. 149, 42 S.E. (2d) 363 (1947); Krider v. Milner, 99 Mo. 145,
12 S.W. 461 (1889); Campbell Banking Co. v. Hamilton, (Tex. Civ. App. 1919) 210 S.W.
621; Railsback v. Bowers, (Mo. 1923) 257 S.W. 119, where a later survey, ignored by the
parties, showed that the agreed line was not tentative.
41 Crowell v. Maughs, 7 Ill. 419 (1845), where ownership on both sides was in the
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Theoretical explanation by the courts of the nature of boundary agreements rarely goes beyond answering the argument that
insofar as an agreement calls for a boundary other than that
which the relevant documents of title would prescribe it
amounts to an oral conveyance contrary to the Statute of
Frauds. Reference has already been made to the occasional assumption by the courts that boundary agreements are analogous
to agreements for the arbitration of boundary disputes and for
this reason they escape the requirements of the Statute of Frauds,
provided the requirement of uncertainty is satisfied.42 In view
of the differences that have been noted between arbitration agreements and the more typical boundary agreements, however, there
may be a question whether the enforcement of the latter is best
explained in contractual terms. At any rate, about all that most
courts say in answer to the argument against parol conveyances
is that a proper boundary agreement does not operate by way of
conveyance but only by way of defining or locating on the ground
the existing titles of the parties.43 This answer also, on first
thought, may not seem sufficient, but it contains, I believe, the
germ of the real explanation of what the courts are trying to do
in these cases and why they are doing it, a fuller elaboration of
which is offered below. 44 It may be said here that this answer
at least has the practical advantage of preserving the integrity
of the muniments of title. There is no need to adjust paper descriptions according to agreed locations where the latter are regovernment; Merrill v. Hilliard, 59 N.H. 481 (1879); Rogers v. White, 33 Tenn. 68
(1853).

J,

42 See Gibson,
in Perkins v.
43 Hoyer v. Edwards, 182 Ark.

Gay, 3 Serg. & R. (Pa.) •327 at •331 (1817).
624, 32 S.W. (2d) 812 (1930); Berghoefer v. Frazier,
150 Ill. 577, 37 N.E. 914 (1894); Steinhilber v. Holmes, 68 Kan. 607, 75 P. 1019 (1904);
Garvin v. Threlkeld, 173 Ky. 262, 190 S.W. 1092 (1917); Archer v. Helm, 69 Miss. 730,
11 S. 3 (1892); Hitchcock v. Libby, 70 N.H. 399, 47 A. 269 (1900); Gwynn v. Schwartz,
32 W.Va. 487, 9 S.E. 880 (1889).
This idea early appeared in Penn v. Lord Baltimore, I Ves. Sr. 444, 27 Eng. Rep.
1132 (1750), which was a portent of the problem that was to harass the American courts.
A controversy arose between the heirs of William Penn and Lord Baltimore over the
boundaries between "their provinces" (Pennsylvania and Maryland). An agreement had
been entered providing for the settlement by drawing certain lines and directing how
they were to ,be run and for commissioners to do the running. Specific performance
of the agreement was decreed in this suit. Chancellor Hardwicke said that this controversy
was "of a nature worthy of the judicature of a Roman senate rather than of a single
judge." He also declared, "To say that such a settlement of boundaries amounts to an
alienation, is not the true idea of it; for if fairly made, without collusion (which cannot
be presumed), the boundaries so settled are to be presumed to be the true and ancient
limits." 27 Eng. Rep. at 1135.
44 See Part VI, "T,he .Meaning of Practical Location," infra.
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garded as but practical constructions of the former: 45 There is
some indication that the Iowa court believes that the Statute
of Frauds is involved, but is avoided by possession in accordance
with the agreement.46
It is scarcely surprising that someone would think of estoppel
in this connection. Of course such an explanation is particularly
indicated where the agreements are binding only if improvements
are made in relian~e upon them. 47 This is explained as a special
kind of estoppel, confined to cases of this sort, and not requiring
any express representations. But there are other references to
estoppel where the ordinary requirements therefor are not present, and where it may be inferred that the courts were simply
yielding to the common temptation to make estoppel serve to
cover a lack of more precise analysis.48
One court was willing to bring its declared policy directly
to bear without borrowing any theoretical catalysts, saying that
convenience, policy, necessity, and justice unite in favor of enforcing such amicable agreements. 49
Effect of Mistake

The frustration experienced in searching through the cases
for a clear idea of the nature and theory of boundary agreements
or the meaning of the requirement of uncertainty may be caused
in part by a corollary rule of startling and far-reaching implications. A large proportion of the courts which have approved the
practical location of boundaries by parol agreement have declared
that, under certain circumstances, if such a location is founded on
a mistaken belief as to the location of the true line, the agreement is not binding. 50 It would be preposterous to say that every

45 See especially Young v. Blakeman, 153 Cal. 477, 95 P. 888 (1908).
46 Kitchen v. Chantland, 130 Iowa 618, 105 N.W. 367 (1906). Cf. Stevenson

v. Robuck,
179 Iowa 461, 161 N.W. 462 (1917); Fredricksen v. Bierent, 154 Iowa 34, 134 N.W. 432
(1912); Uker v. Thieman, 132 Iowa 79, 107 N.W. 167 (1906).
47 Gove v. White, 20 Wis. 425 (1866). See also Turner v. Baker, 64 Mo. 218 (1876);
St. :Bede College v. Weber, 168 Ill. 324, 48 N.E. 165 (1897), where there was a building
in conformity to the agreement, although this fact was not emphasized.
48Berghoefer v. Frazier, 150 Ill. 577, 37 N.'E. 914 (1894); Adams v. Betz, 167 Ind.
161, 78 N.E. 649 (1906); Edwards v. Fleming, 83 Kan. 653, 112 P. 836 (1911); Griffin v.
Mahoney, (La. App. 1951) 56 S. (2d) 208; Terry v. Chandler, 16 N.Y. 354 (1857); Rutledge
v. Presbyterian Church, 3 Ohio App. 177 (1914); Wilson v. Hudson, 16 Tenn. 398 (1835).
49 Levy v. >Maddox, 81 Tex. 210, 16 S.W. 877 (1891). Cf. Box Elder Livestock Co.
v. Glynn, 58 Mont. 561, 193 P. 1117 (1920), where the court said that an agreement was
the best way of determining a .true boundary and tends to prevent litigation.
r;o Schraeder Mining Co. v. Packer, 129 U.S. 688 (1888); Short v. Mauldin, (Ark.
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agreement on a line which was later proved not to be the true
line was void, for then no such agreement could have any independent significance.51 The courts have not said this, and evidently they do not mean it. One court seems to be using by
analogy the mistake rule which many courts apply to adverse
possession. If the parties possess according to a line which they
accept as the true line but claiming only to the true line, they
are not bound if the former is proved not to be the true line.52
Several other courts, although speaking in terms of mistake, really
seem to be objecting to an agreement because it was not made to
resolve a dispute over the boundary.53 But most courts would
not explain the mistake rule in such terms as these. They sometimes say merely that it is the mistaken attempt by the parties to
find the true line which deprives the agreed line of legal significance. 54 If this is not me.aningful, it has sometimes been said that
the acceptable alternative to a mere attempt to find the true line
is that the parties shall have agreed to adopt an unascertained or
disputed line55 or shall have. sought to "establish" a line.56
The sort of agreement which would most obviously avoid
the difficulty which seems to be bothering the courts at this point
is the arbitration-type of agreement, where the parties settle a
dispute over their boundary by agreement to have their line run
and to be bound by it.57 Such an agreement could be supported
1956) 296 S.W. (2d) 197; Sonnemann v. Mertz, 221 Ill. 362, 77 N.E. 550 (1906); Kyte v.
Chessmore, 106 Kan. 394, 188 P. 251 (1920); Skaggs v. Skaggs, 212 Ky. 836, 280 S.W.
150 (1926); Bemis v. Bradley, 126 Me. 462, 139 A. 593 (1927); Blank v. Ambs, 260 Mich.
589, 245 N.W. 525 (1932); :Benz v. St. Paul, 89 Minn. 31, 93 N.W. 1038 (1903); Klaar v.
Lemperis, (Mo. 1957) 303 S.W. (2d) 55; Kimes v. Libby, 87 Neb. 113, 126 N.W. 869
(1910); Lake v. Crosser, 202 Okla. 582, 216 ·P. (2d) 583 (1950). The following possibly
may be to the same effect: Teasley v. Roberson, 149 Miss. 188, 115 S. 211 (1928); Lennox
v. Hendricks, 11 Ore. 33, 4 P. 515 (1883); Wood v. Bapp, 41 S.D. 195, 169 N.W. 518
(1918); Burnell v. Maloney, 39 Vt. 579 (1867); Pickett v. Nelson, 79 Wis. 9, 47
N.W. 936 (1891). See Small v. Robbins, 33 Nev. 288 at 300, 110 P. 1128 (1910). Cf. Coon
v. Smith, 29 N.Y. 392 (1864); Perkins v. Gay, 3 Serg. & R. (Pa.) •327 (1817); Rocher v.
Williams, 183 Okla. 221, 80 P. (2d) 649 (1938), where the court said that mistake would
defeat an agreement, but not after acquiescence had continued for the statutory period.
51See Gibson, J, in Perkins v. Gay, 3 Serg. & R. (Pa.) •325 at •331 (1817).•
52 Chostner v. Schrock, (Mo. 1933) 64 S.W. (2d) 664; Barnes v. Allison, 166 Mo. 96,
65 S.W. 781 (1901). See also Hatfield v. Workman, 35 W.Va. 578, 14 S.E. 153 (1891).
5S Skaggs v. Skaggs, 212 Ky. 836, 280 S.W. 150 (1926); De Long v. Baldwin, 111 Mich.
466, 69 N.W. 831 (1897); Hatfield v. Workman, 35 W.Va. 578, 14 S.E. 153 (1891).
54 Kyte v. Chesmore, 106 Kan. 394, 188 P. 251 (1920); Blank v. Ambs, 260 Mich.
589, 245 N.W. 525 (1932); Benz v. St. Paul, 89 Minn. 31, 93 N.W. 1038 (1903); Patton v.
Smith, 171 ,Mo. 231, 71 S.W. 187 (1902).
55 Sonnemann v. Mertz, 221 Ill. 362, 77 N.E. 550 (1906).
56 Bemis v. !Bradley, 126 'Me. 462, 139 A. 593 (1927).
57 But cf. Wilson v. Stork, 171 Wis. 561, 177 N.W. 878 (1920), which seems to hold
that mistake vitiates the agreement even in this situation.
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where the parties are not disputing but are only "uncertain"
about their line, as long as they could be said to have conclusively
submitted the question to determination by survey or otherwise.
But most of the boundary-agreement cases do not involve this
sort of undertaking. As has been seen, it is often only after a line
has been run, with varying degrees of formality, that the parties
"agree" to accept the line as their boundary. In this situation what
meaning can there be to the distinction between agreeing to
establish a line and merely seeking to find the true line? It may
be assumed that every acceptable boundary agreement is founded
on some effort to find the true line or on an assumption as to its
location. Surely it is not the fact that the parties sought to find
the true line which vitiates their agreement. References to several decisions and dicta may better serve to reveal the distinction
which many courts may have apprehended but have riot yet made
articulate.
The Nebraska court in one case applied the mistake rule
where the parties, after a survey, had agreed to accept the surveyed line; 58 but in another case it seemed that after a su,rvey had
been made, there still remained some uncertainty, of which the
parties were aware, about the location of the true line, and they
nevertheless agreed on the surveyed line rather than go to the
trouble and expense which the court said would have been required finally to resolve the doubt. 59 In the latter case the agreed
boundary was approved. The Oklahoma court, in one of its leading cases, 60 approved an agreement which it said was made to
avoid the expense of a survey. The court also said that the parties
acted knowing that the line agreed on might not be the true line.
The implication is clear that if they had agreed on a surveyed line
on the assumption that the survey had located the true line,
subsequent proof that the true line was elsewhere would have
vitiated their agreement. One hundred fifty years ago, Justice
Gibson, speaking for the Pennsylvania court in Perkins v. Gay, 61

Kimes v. Libby, 87 Neb. 113, 126 N.W. 869 (1910).
Lynch v. Egan, 67 Neb. 541, 93 N.W. 775 (1903).
60 Lake v. Crosser, 202 Okla. 582, 216 P. (2d) 583 (1950).
613 Serg. & R. (Pa.) •327 at •331 (1817): "It was laid down in general terms, that if,
at the time of an agreement to establish a consentable line, as we technically call it,
the parties labour under a mistake as to their respective rights, they will not be bound.
To this doctrine I do not assent; no boundary of the sort could in any case prevail,
if it were law, for the consideration of the agreement, is, in ninety-nine cases out of a
hundred, the settlement of a dispute arising from ignorance and misapprehension of
right on both sides. If, to prevent irritation until the true line be ascertained, a temporary
58
59
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presented a fuller analysis of this problem than has since appeared
in any other case. His statement is not free from ambiguity, but
after rejecting the argument that mistake generally defeats a
"consentable line" (that court's term for an agreed boundary),
he did say in effect that where the parties proceed on the basis
that the subject of the agreement is doubtful, and take account
of the risk that each must assume as a consequence of that doubt,
their agreement will be binding notwithstanding any mistake.
Something of the same idea seems to be expressed by Smith, J,
speaking for the Arkansas court in the most recent case in that
state on the subject. 62 He put the distinction in terms of "conscious" and "unconscious" mistake. In the former case the parties
assume the risk that the agreed line may not coincide with the
true line. 63 But an unconscious mistake vitiates the agreement.
Attempting to summarize these observations, it appears that
the courts may wish to require that one of the essential features
of agreements which call for arbitration shall also be present in
those agreements which do not; that in the latter case, while it is
the conduct of the parties themselves, rather than that of an arbitrator or surveyor, which determines the location of the line, they
must intend or be aware that what they are doing is to settle that
which until the moment of their agreement remained in some
doubt. If what they have done before their agreement convinces
them that they have found the true line, and they agree to it
on that basis but are later proved to have been mistaken, their
agreement is not binding. They must either not have tried very

boundary, predicated on the avowed ignorance of the parties, be established, to a full
understanding that it is not to be permanent; there is no doubt it will not have effect
beyond the terms of the agreement. So if the parties, from misapprehension, adjust their
fences, and exercise acts of ownership, in conformity with a line which turns out not
to be the true boundary; or permission be ignorantly given to place a fence on the land
of the party, this will not amount to an agreement, or be binding as the assent of the
parties; and I agree it is a principle of equity, that the parties to an agreement must
be acquainted with the extent of their rights and the nature of the information they
can call for respecting them, else they will not be bound. The reason is, that they proceed
under an idea that the fact which is the inducement to the agreement, is in a particular
way, and give their assent, not absolutely, but on conditions that are falsefied by the
event•••. But where the parties treat upon a basis that the fact which is the subject
of the agreement is doubtful, and the consequent risk each is to encounter is taken into
consideration in the stipulations assented to, the contract will ,be valid notwithstanding
any mistake of one of the parties, provided there be no concealment or unfair dealing
by the opposite party, that would affect any other contract.''
62 Short v. Mauldin, (Ark. 1956) 296 S.W. (2d) 197 at 198. Cf. Peebles v. Starnes, 208
Ark. 834, 188 S.W. (2d) 289 (1945), where an agreement without a survey was upheld.
63 Cf. Peters v. Reichenbach, 114 Wis. 209, 90 N.W. 184 (1902).
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hard to find their line, or having tried, they must still remain in
doubt about having found it before it can be said that they have
"established" a line and have not merely tried to find it.
Such a doctrine may reflect the courts' fear of catching the
parties in a trap of their own setting and their reluctance to give
legal sanction to the informal acts of parties unless they understand the full import of what they are doing. 64 It may also reflect the tacit influence of a contract rationale: the necessity for
some semblance of consideration, which can be found here only
to the extent that each of the parties consciously surrenders a
potential claim to assert a boundary different from the one agreed
on. If the mistake rule is stated in terms of the requirement of uncertainty-and this is sometimes done-it would mean that the
required uncertainty refers to the state of mind of the parties and
must continue until the very moment of the agreement. When applied for such a purpose, the requirement of uncertainty shifts
from its role as a safeguard against parol conveyances and serves
to insure that boundary agreements are supported by consideration.
It may be pertinent to inquire whether the mistake rule, explained in terms of a consideration requirement, is soun4 in the
light of what is or should be the purpose of boundary agreements
and the policy that is served by them. Does this explanation of
the rule, in other words, demonstrate the danger of trying to explain the real objectives of these transactions in contractual terms?
Further comment on this point appears below. 65
In attempting to administer the mistake rule as it has been
interpreted herein, it will be seen that the courts are left to face
a kind of Scylla-and-Charybdis operation. If a survey or preliminary investigation by the parties has convinced them of the loca.tion of the true line, they cannot deliberately disregard it and
adopt another, lest they violate the requirement of uncertainty
and fail for having tried to transfer land informally. But neither
in such a case can they adopt such a line with binding effect if it is
later proved that their conviction about its location was mistaken. One might wonder what a court would do with a case in
which the parties agreed on a line other than the one which they
believed was the true line, but it turned out that neither the line

64 Comment will be made later on the justification for such a fear. See Part VI,
"Tthe Meaning of Practical Location," infra.
115 Ibid.
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they agreed on nor the one they disregarded was the true line. At
any rate, where the mistake rule is applied with the meaning
above indicated, the area in which parties can fix their boundaries by informal agreement is confined within very narrow
bounds. The room for agreement is even more restricted if a
court holds that the requirement of uncertainty is not met where
the parties have not made some minimal effort to find the true
line.611 Here the parties must make some effort to find the true
line or their agreement will fail for want of compliance with the
requirement of uncertainty and a resulting violation of the Statute of Frauds; but if such efforts reach the point of convincing
them erroneously that they have found the true line, and they
agree on that basis, their agreement will fail because of mistake,
which also may be explained in terms of the uncertainty requirement, but which is applied in this instance as a requirement of
consideration.
In trying to appraise the effect of the mistake rule in the
boundary agreement cases, some uncertainty must be attributed
to the failure of some courts to make clear what they mean oy
mistake, and whether they would interpret it as it has been interpreted herein. So long as the requirement is undefined, room
is left for a court to throw out any agreement on the ground that
the agreed line was founded on a mistake of fact. Even where
mistake is defined as indicated herein, it is not clear what sort of
proof will be required to avoid it. Little help is to be found in
the opinions. In most of the cases no question of mistake was
raised. In some of these it could be inferred that the mistake test
could have been passed, had it been put, because the parties
agreed without a survey or to avoid a survey, from which it could
have been inferred that they did not agree merely on the assumption that the true line had been found. 67 More commonly, however, agreements have been upheld, without mention of mistake,
where they were made following surveys of the land, a circumstance which, in the absence of other proof, suggests that the parties agreed on the assumption that the survey had located the true
66 See notes 14-16
67 E.g., Peebles v.

supra. Cf. Olin v. Henderson, 120 Mich. 149, 79 N.W. 178 (1899).
McDonald, 208 Ark. 834, 188 S.W. (2d) 289 (1945); Euse v. Gibbs,
(Fla. 1951) 49 S. (2d) 843; Shiver v. Hill, 148 Ga. 616, 97 S.E. 676 (1918); Horn v. Thompson, 389 III. 176, 58 N.E. (2d) 896 (1945); Reynolds v. Hood, 209 Mo. 611, 108 S.W. 86
(1908). Cf. Hoar v. Hennessy, 29 Mont. 253, 74 P. 452 (1903), where there had been a
survey, but a dispute followed whether the survey was correct, which was then followed
by an agreement; Rodriguez v. La Cueva Ranch Co., 17 N.M. 246, 134 P. 228 (1912),
where the agreement was written and expressly recognized an existing uncertainty.
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line, which in turn should render such agreements vulnerable to
the mistake rule. 68 Indeed in nearly every state where the mistake
rule has been adopted cases are to be found in which no mention
of mistake was made, and many of these are cases which fall in
the category last mentioned.
Further questions remain unanswered. To what extent will
the courts draw inferences from the two kinds of fact situations
mentioned in the preceding paragraph? What other fact situations
will form the basis for inferences as to the intention of the parties
in regard to the mistake requirements? Will the parties be allowed
to testify directly on the question of their precise intention at the
time of the agreement? As to the last question, since the agreement itself is oral and informal, no objection may be possible to
the admissibility of this kind of testimony, although its reliability will certainly diminish as the purpose of such a question becomes apparent.
It must be concluded that the uncertainties about the nature
of the mistake rule and the extent of any court's commitment to
it, together with the other difficulties previously noted in determining what a boundary agreement is and when and why it will
be given effect, reduce the predictability of decision on the effect
of such agreements almost to zero.
Cases· from two states specifically reject the mistake rule, 69
although in one of them70 the facts were such as to have passed
the test of mistake as defined above if it had been applied.

II.

ACQUIESCENCE

There is a large body of authority to the effect that a boundary
may be given a binding practical location by what the courts call
the acquiescence of adjoining landowners. It is evident that the
precise meaning of this kind of practical location is as elusive as
practical location by parol agreement. In fact it may be noted

68 E.g., Bennett v. Swafford, 146 Ga. 473, 91 S.E. 553 (1917); Bloomington v. Bloomington Cemetery Assn., 126 Ill. 221, 18 N.E. 298 (1888); Kitchen v. Cbantland, 130 Iowa
618, 105 N.W. 367 •(1906); Steinhilber v. Holmes, 68 Kan. 607, 75 P. 1019 (1904); Carver
v. Turner, 310 Ky. 99, 219 S.W. (2d) 409 (1949); Smith v. Hamilton, 20 -Mich. 433 (1870);
Schwartzer v. Gebhardt, 157 Mo. 99, 57 S.W. 782 (1900); Box Elder Livestock Co. v.
Glynn, 58 'Mont. 561, 193 P. 1117 (1920); Hitchcock v. Libby, 70 N.H. 399, 47 A. 269
(1900); Huffman v. Mills, 131 W.Va. 218, 46 S.E. (2d) 787 (1948).
69 Lindsay v. Springer, 4 Harr. (Del. Super.) 547 (1848); Cooper v. Austin, 58 Tex.
494 (1883). Cf. Beatty v. Taylor, 187 Iowa 723, 174 N.W. 484 (1919), where there was an
agreement on a line, but the court applied its rule of acquiescence.
70 Cooper v. Austin, 58 Tex. 494 (1883).
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at the outset that practical location by acquiescence and by parol
agreement are not neatly separable. One reason for this is obvious: the acquiescence of the parties is often held to be a factor
in the practical location of a boundary by parol agreement.
Other reasons will appear. It is the position of a large number
of courts that a boundary can be established by the acquiescence
of the parties for the period of the statute of limitations applicable to adverse possession cases.71 In others the stated effect of
acquiescence is accepted, but the applicability of the period of
the statute of limitations is left in doubt. 72 Georgia has a statute
which provides for the determination of a boundary by seven
years' acquiescence.73 In other states similar effect has been given
to "long acquiescence." 74 In most of the latter the acquiescence
exceeded the statutory period in fact. Judging by the experience
of some of the courts in the first category, some of the latter
courts may in time impose the statutory period. Others may de-

71 Brown v. Leete, (C.C. Nev. 1880) 2 F. 440; Arizona: Hein v. Nutt, 66 Ariz. 107,
184 P. (2d) 656 (1947); Arkansas: Seidenstricker v. Holtzendorff, 214 Ark. 644, 217 S.W.
(2d) 836 (1949); California: Sneed v. Osborn, 25 Cal. 619 (1864); Florida: Palm Orange
Groves v. Yelvington, (Fla. 1949) 41 S. (2d) 883; Iowa: Miller v. Mills County, 111 Iowa
654, 82 N.W. 1038 (1900); Kentucky: Rice v. Shoemaker, (Ky. 1956) 286 S.W. (2d) 523;
Maine: Faught v. Holway, 50 Me. 24 (1861); Michigan: Johnson v. Squires, 344 Mich.
687, 75 N.W. (2d) 45 (1956); Minnesota: Beardsley v. Crane, 52 Minn. 537, 54 N.W. 740
(1893); Nebraska: Romine v. West, 134 Neb. 274, 278 N.W. 490 (1938); Nevada: Adams
v. Child, 28 Nev. 169, 88 P. 1087 (1905); New York: Baldwin v. Brown, 16 N.Y. 359
(1857); North Dakota: Bernier v. Preckel, 60 N.D. 549, 236 N.W. 243 (1931); Pennsylvania:
Miles v. Pennsylvania Coal Co., 245 Pa. 94, 91 A. 211 (1914); Rhode Island: Malone v.
O'Connell, (R.I. 1957) 133 A. (2d) 756; South Carolina: Klapman v. Hook, 206 S.C. 51,
32 S.E. (2d) 882 (1945); South Dakota: Wood v. Bapp, 41 S.D. 195, 169 N.W. 518 (1918);
Washington: Lindley v. Johnston, 42 Wash. 257, 84 P. 822 (1906); West Virginia: Gwynn
v. Schwartz, 32 W.Va. 487, 9 S.E. 880 (1889); Wyoming: Carstensen v. Brown, 32 Wyo.
491, 236 P. 517 (1925). Other cases may stand for the same proposition, but the question
is left in some doubt: Illinois: Ginther v. Duginger, 6 Ill. (2d) 474, 129 N.E. (2d) 147
(1955); Indiana: Curless v. State, 172 Ind. 257, 87 N.E. 129 (1909); Vermont: Brown v.
Edson, 23 Vt. 435 (1851). Cf. Vermont Marble Co. v. Eastman, 91 Vt. 425, 101 A. 151
(1917).
72 Colorado: Prieshof v. Baum, 94 Colo. 324, 29 P. (2d) 1032 (1934); Oklahoma: Lake
v. Crosser, 202 Okla. 582, 216 P. (2d) 583 (1950).
73 Ga. Code Ann. (1955) §85-1602. Cf. Iowa Code Ann. (1950) §650.6, which has been
construed to have a similar effect, Davis v. Curtis, 68 Iowa 66, 25 N.W. 932 (1885), but
this section has been rarely relied on in recent years; Neb. Rev. Stat. (1952) §34-301.
74 Missouri: Mothershead v. Milfeld, 361 'Mo. 704, 236 S.W. (2d) 343 (1951); Tennessee:
Davis v. Jones, 40 Tenn. 603 (1859); Utah: Provonsha v. Pitman, (Utah 1957) 305 P. (2d)
486; Wisconsin: Grell v. Ganser, 255 Wis. 381, 39 N.W. (2d) 397 (1949). See Mississippi:
Hulbert v. Fayard, (Miss. 1957) 92 S. (2d) 247 at 251; New Hampshire: Berry v. Garland,
26 N.H. 473, 482 (1853). Others may be to the same effect, although the question is in
doubt. Kansas: Fyler v. Hartness, 171 Kan. 49, 229 P. (2d) 751 (1951); Montana: Borgeson v. Tubb, 54 Mont. 557, 172 P. 326 (1918); New Mexico: Woodburn v. Grimes 58
N.M. 717, 275 P. (2d) 850 (1954); Oregon: Ogilvie v. Stackland, 92 Ore. 352, 179 P. 669
(1919).
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liberately leave the period flexible. In Missouri, for example, the
court said that the period must be long enough to show mutual
acceptance of the boundary or that the parties were conscious of
it.75 Some reference should be made to decisions determining
boundaries on the basis of long general recognition thereof in
urban areas as shown by lot lines on the ground, sidewalks, and
streets. It has been so held in Massachusetts, which does not otherwise recognize the doctrine of practical location by parol agreement or acquiescence. 76 But in none of these cases is any explanation offered for the results reached.

The Requirements and Theory of Acquiescence
,The largest proportion of the courts which have accepted
practical location in terms of acquiescence alone have nevertfieless explained their position on the basis that acquiescence is evidence of an agreement between the parties, as conclusive evidence
of such an agreement, or as a basis for inferring an agreement.77
It may be that some courts regard long acquiescence in a line on
the ground as raising a presumption that an express boundary
agreement was made in the past. 78 If this presumption is conclusive, one is reminded of the lost-grant theory of prescription. The
rule becomes one of policy, not of evidence. For the most part,
however, the courts seem to be proceeding on the basis that acquiescence, rathe:i;- than raising a presumption of an unproved
agreement, is evidence of an agreement implied in fact from such
acquiescence. In other words, a boundary agreement may be expressly made, or implied from conduct, acquiescence for the required period being a specifically designated category of the

75 Tillman v. Hutcherson, 348 Mo. 473, 154 S.W. (2d) 104 (1941); Diers v. Peterson,
290 Mo. 249, 234 S.W. 792 (1921).
76 Hathaway v. Evans, 108 Mass. 267 (1871); Chenery v. Inhabitants of Waltham, 62
Mass. 327 (1851); Kellogg v. Smith, 61 Mass. 375 (1851). See also Butler v. Vicksburg,
(Miss. 1895) 17 S. 605; Crandall v. Mary, 67 Ore. 18, 135 P. 188 (1913).
77 Brown v. Leete, (C.C. Nev. 1880) 2 F. 440; Seidenstricker v. Holtzendorff, 214 Ark.
644, 217 S.W. (2d) 836 (1949); Sneed v. Osborn, 25 Cal. 619 (1864); Axmear v. Richards,
112 Iowa 657, 84 N.W. 686 (1900); Fyler v. Hartness, 171 Kan. 49, 229 P. (2d) 751 (1951);
Garvin v. Threlkeld, 173 Ky. 262, 190 S.W. 1092 (1917); Mothershead v. Milfeld, 361
Mo. 704, 236 S.W. (2d) 343 (1951); Malone v. O'Connell, (R.I. 1957) 133 A. (2d) 756;
Hummel v. Young, 1 Utah (2d) 237, 265 P. (2d) 410 (1953); Gwynn v. Schwartz, 32 W.Va.
487, 9 S.E. 880 (1889); Carstensen v. Brown, 32 Wyo. 491, 236 P. 517 (1925).
78 Roberts v. Brae, 5 Cal. (2d) 356, 54 P. (2d) 698 (1936); Board of Public Instruction
v. Boehm, 138 Fla. 548, 189 S. 663 (1939); Mitchell Willis Coal Co. v. Liberty Coal Co.,
220 Ky. 661, 295 S.W. 987 (1927); Stumpe v. Kopp, 201 Mo. 412, 99 S.W. 1073 (1907);
Dragos v. Russell, 120 Utah 626, 237 P. (2d) 831 (1951).
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latter. Under this view, when a court says that acquiescence is
conclusive evidence of an agreement, presumably all that is meant
is that the required proof of acquiescence is alone sufficient proof
of an agreement.
Not all courts, however, have been consistent in this regard.
The Arkansas court, after previously determining a boundary on
the basis of acquiescence alone for the statutory period, 79 held
that evidence of acquiescence in a fence for fifty years was not
enough without other evidence of an agreement between the adjoining owners. 80 Similarly, the Utah court, after some vacillation,81 expressly left open the question whether proof that no
express agreement in fact was ever entered would prevent a
boundary from being determined by acquiescence.82 The California court held on one occasion that acquiescence in a fence was
not sufficient in the absence of other evidence of an agreement, 83
although in a later case the court held to the contrary.84 Such
views as these are directly contrary to any proposition that acquiescence is alone sufficient proof of an agreement. If the courts
were thinking of acquiescence as raising a presumption of an express agreement, it is clear that they do not regard the presumption as conclusive. It is possible that these courts were thinking of
acquiescence solely as a post-agreement requirement, in which
case it could not serve this function unless an agreement had by
other means first been made. At any rate the views mentioned in
this paragraph have not received general acceptance.
It is easy to foresee the prospect of confusion where boundary
agreements must be supported by acquiescence and where acquiescence also is given separate significance, but only in terms of
implying an agreement. It is necessary to inquire what the courts
mean by acquiescence.
The term connotes passivity. But it also implies the existence
of something in which to acquiesce. In the present context the
primary condition of acquiescence is the physical designation in
some manner of a line on the ground. Must acquiescence in that
79 Seidenstricker

v. Holtzendorff, 214 Ark. 644, 217 S.W. (2d) 836 (1949).
so Brown Paper Mill Co. y. Warnix, 222 Ark. 417, 259 S.W. (2d) 495 (1953). It should
be added that there was some evidence here that the fence was not intended to mark
the boundary.
81 Hummel v. Young, I Utab (2d) 237, 265 P. (2d) 410 (1953).
82 Ringwood v. Bradford, 2 Utah (2d) 119, 269 P. (2d) 1053 (1954).
83 Dauberman v. Grant, 198 Cal. 586, 246 P. 319 (1926). Cf. Thomas v. Harlan, 27
Wash. (2d) 512, 178 P. (2d) 965 (1947).
84 Hannah v. Pogue, 23 Cal. (2d) 849, 147 P. (2d) 572 (1944).
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line mean something more than conduct consistent with its continued existence? It obviously must mean conduct which signifies
assent to that line as a boundary. What sort of conduct supplies
evidence of such assent? It is easy to think of words and acts,
short of an express boundary agreement, which would serve such
a purpose. Must some such affirmative conduct always be present?
Under what circumstances will mere inaction or silence be significant? The word "recognition" is frequently used instead of or
together with "acquiescence." This word connotes an active ingredient. But recognition may be only momentary, while acquiescence connotes the continuity of circumstances that is required. One of the requirements insisted upon by the courts is
that acquiescence be mutual.85 T4is too suggests conduct that is
not wholly passive. An active-passive essence is indicated by one
court's statement that "to acquiesce means to rest satisfied without opposition, to submit without opposition or question, to yield
assent.... It must be done by acts or declarations on the part of
those who are claimed to have acquiesced...." 86 Another court
explained in this way, "It must be kept in mind that the acquiescence required is not merely passive consent to the existence
of a fence, ... but rather is conduct or lack thereof from which
assent to the fence ... as a boundary line may be reasonably inferred."87 May we conclude tentatively that acquiescence means
mutual recognition over a period of time of a line on the ground
as a boundary? If so, the notion that acquiescence also raises a
presumption of an agreement made in the past is unnecessary
and misleading. If it is to be explained, on the other hand, as a
way of manifesting the necessary assent, or as constituting an
agreement implied from conduct, we are still left to inquire what
sort of conduct is sufficient for this purpose, to what extent passivity must be supported by activity, and whether acquiescence
means the same thing in all cases.
Where there has been an express boundary agreement, any
supporting acquiescence may be wholly passive. It would be assumed that the parties have acquiesced unless by later words or
acts they manifest a change of mind. So it would be where ac-

85 De Viney v. Hughes, 243 Iowa 1388, 55 N.W. (2d) 478 (1952); Hakanson v. Manders,
158 Neb. 392, 63 N.W. (2d) 436 (1954); Ward v. Rodriguez, 43 N:M. 191, 88 P. (2d) 277
(1939); Nelson v. Da Rouch, 87 Utah 457, 50 P. (2d) 273 (1935); State v. Vanderkoppel,
45 Wyo. 432, 19 P. (2d) 955 (1933).
86 Thompson v. Simmons, 143 Ga. 95, 84 S.E. 370 (1914).
87 Engquist v. Wirtjes, 243 Minn. 502 at 507, 63 N.W. (2d) 412 (1955).
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quiescence is merely a post-agreement requirement. Where there
is an initial agreement, a court may still speak solely in terms of
acquiescence, treating the agreement not as having independent
significance, but merely as supplying the active ingredient of acquiescence. 88 The same analysis may be made where the initial
manifestation of assent to a line as a boundary is not an express
agreement but one implied from the parties' conduct.89
There are many cases, however, in which there were no express boundary agreements nor facts which would justify the inference that at any particular point of time an agreement had
been manifested by the conduct of the parties. There are cases,
for example, in which the conduct of the parties is equivocal,
such as the erection or maintenance of a fence or possession to a
fence or other line established some time in the past. In such a
case the time element may assume controlling importance and
serve to characterize their equivocal conduct. Such conduct is at
least consistent with an intention to accept the line as a boundary
or a belief that it marked the true line, and where the required
period of time has passed without any manifestation of a contrary purpose, it may be permissible to infer that their assent has
been given.90 Or even more clearly, subsequent words or acts may
give color to their equivocal conduct. It would still be appropriate
to speak in terms of an implied agreement, but this would be an
agreement in a special sense, meaningful only in relation to the
special requirements of acquiescence. Here again, both the active
and passive ingredients of acquiescence are present, but with the
passive element assuming a rather special significance. We should
realize that in such a case the parties are always allowed to prove
if they can that a fence or hedge was erected only for convenience
or as a barrier,91 or subject to the future determination of the

88 McGill v. •Dowman, 195 Ga. 357, 24 S:E. (2d) 195 (1943); Lannigan v. Andre, 241
Iowa 1027, 44 N.W. (2d) 354 (1950); Beatty v. Taylor, 187 Iowa 723, 174 N.W. 484 (1919);
Miskotten v. Drenten, 318 Mich. 538, 29 N.W. (2d) 91 (1947); Di Santo v. De Bellis, 55
R.I. 433, 182 A. 488 (1935); Harman v. Alt, 69 W.Va. 287, 71 S.E. 709 (1911). Cf. Clark
v. Tabor, 28 Vt. 222 (1856); Wollman v. Ruehle, 100 Wis. 31, 75 N.W. 425 (1898).
89 Rogers v. -Moore, 207 Ga. 182, 60 S.E. (2d) 359 (1950); Helberg v. Kepler, 178
Iowa 354, 159 N.W. 972 (1916); Griffin v. Brown, 167 Iowa 599, 149 N.W. 833 (1914);
Gregory v. Thorrez, 277 Mich. 197, 269 N.W. 142 (1936); Ekberg v. Bates, 121 Utah 123,
239 P. (2d) 205 (1951).
90 See especially Dake v. Ward, 168 Iowa 118, 150 N.W. 50 (1914).
91 Grants Pass Land and Water Co. v. Brown, 168 Cal. 456, 143 P. 754 (1914); Shaw
v. Williams, (Fla. 1951) 50 S. (2d) 125; O'Dell v. Hanson, 241 Iowa 657, 42 N.W. (2d)
86 (1950); Jones v. Smith, 64 N.Y. 180 (1876); Ungaro v. Mete, 68 R.I. 419, 27 A. (2d)
826 (1942); Harrison v. Lanoway, 214 S.C. 294, 52 S.E. (2d) 264 (1949); Ringwood v.
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boundary. 92 Where there is proof merely of the long existence of
a fence, some courts have indicated that no presumptions are
available and that a claim of acquiescence will fail without other
proof.93 But in other cases, where there is evidence of possession
or other acts in conformity to the alleged line, the impression is
left that the courts have tacitly assumed that long-existing fences
were intended or believed to mark boundaries, 94 if in fact a court
has not raised an inference or presumption to that effect.95 The inference of an acceptance of a fence as a boundary may be stronger
where the fence was erected following a slirvey.06 It is not indicated whether the purpose of equivocal conduct can be supplied
solely by the testimony of the parties, but no basis for the exclusion of such testimony is evident other than its questionable
reliability. 97 The question of proof of acquiescence will in tlie
first instance normally be submitted to a jury. This explains why
in so many cases the facts of acquiescence are not fully reported.
The instructions to a jury also are seldom reported, but it may
be doubted that juries are always adequately instructed. Whether
instructions are put merely in general terms, or with some explanation of the meaning of acquiescence, it is probable that juries
have based their findings of acquiescence both on proof of express and implied agreements with passive acquiescence therein
and on inferences from equivocal acts or silence or appraisals of
conflicting testimony.

Bradford, 2 Utah (2d) 119, 269 P. (2d) 1053 (1954); Thomas v. Harlan, 27 Wash. (2d)
512, 178 P. (2d) 965 (1947); Johnson v. Szumowicz, 63 Wyo. 211, 179 P. (2d) 1012 (1947).
92 Brown
93 Hill v.

v. Brown, 18 Idaho 345, 110 P. 269 (1910).
Schumacher, 45 Cal. App. 362, 187 P. 437 (1919); :Benjamin v. O'Rourke,
197 Iowa 1338, 199 N.W. 488 (1924); Ennis v. Stanley, 346 Mich. 296, 78 N.W. (2d) 114
(1956); Reel v. Walter, (Mont. 1957) 309 P. (2d) 1027; Ward v. Rodriguez, 43 N.M. 191,
88 P. (2d) 277 (1939); Harrison v. Lanoway, 214 S.C. 294, 52 S.E. (2d) 264 (1949).
94 Seidenstricker v. Holtzendorff, 214 Ark. 644, 217 S.W. (2d) 836 (1949); Dye v.
Dotson, 201 Ga. 1, 39 S.E. (2d) 8 (1946); Mitchell Willis Coal Co. v. Liberty Coal Co.,
220 Ky. 661, 295 S.W. 987 (1927); F.H. Wolf Brick Co. v. Lonyo, 132 Mich. 162, 93 N.W.
251 (1903); McCoy v. Hance, 28 Pa. 149 (1857). See Missouri cases cited note 140 infra.
Of particular interest are the cases in Iowa, where the court has had more occasion than
in any other state to consider the requirements of acquiescence. Concannon v. Blackman,
232 Iowa 722, 6 N.W. (2d) 116 (1942); Brown v. •Bergman, 204 Iowa 1006, 216 N.W. 731
(1927); Chandler v. Hopson, 188 Iowa 281, 175 N.W. 62 (1919); Tice v. Shangle, 182
Iowa 601, 164 N.W. 246 (1917).
95 Dake v. Ward, 168 Iowa 118, 150 N.W. 50 (1914); Woodburn v. Grimes, 58 N.M.
717, 275 P. (2d) 850 (1954); Lewis v. Smith, 187 Okla. 404, 103 P. (2d) 512 (1940); Provonsha
v. Pitman, (Utah 1957) 305 P. (2d) 486; Lindley v. Johnston, 42 Wash. 257, 84 P. 822
(1906).
96 Sneed v. Osborn, 25 Cal. 619 (1864).
97 Cf. Dake v. Ward, 168 Iowa 118, 150 N.W. 50 (1914).
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From the confusing blend of agreement and acquiescence concepts of practical location we must conclude that the results in
some cases can be explained either in terms of an agreement with
subsequent acquiescence or of acquiescence alone but that there
are other cases which can be adequately explained only in terms
of acquiescence in a somewhat different sense. To speak of the
latter cases also as constituting agreements is to use that term in
a looser sense even than is found in cases where boundaries are
established by agreement without acquiescence. All this means
that the term "acquiescence" may be used with at least three varying meanings. In one case it may be wholly passive, referring to
a post-agreement requirement. In another: case with the same facts
it may refer both to the initial "agreement," express or implied,
and to the passive conduct which follows. In a third case it may
also refer to both active and passive conduct, but which are
blended and often concurrent and perhaps inseparable.
, Not all courts, however, have chosen to explain their rule of
acquiescence in terms of boundary agreements. A different theory
was first announced by the New York court in Baldwin v.
Brown. 98 The requisite acquiescence is evidence of the true line
so conclusive that the parties are precluded from offering evidence
to the contrary. The rule is identified as a "rule of repose," which
is supported by the same reason as supports the doctrine of adverse possession. Other courts' have adopted the same rationale
for their decisions. 99 There are two thoughts here. The latter is
prescriptive. But calling acquiescence conclusive evidence of tbe
true line is something else. Prescription carries no respect for the
true line. And it is not easy to see how proof of acquiescence is
necessarily proof of the location of the true line. This theory may
rather reflect a realization of the basic problem of practical location: the bridging of the gap between a description and a boundary on the ground, and a revulsion against the notion of a boundary which shifts with every new survey. If a boundary is to be locat9816 N.Y. 359 (1857).
99 Biggins v. Champlin, 59 Cal. 113 (1881); Miller v. Mills County, 111 Iowa 654, 82
N.W. 1038 (1900); Hotze v. Ring, 273 Ky. 48, 115 S.W. (2d) 311 (1938); Bartlett v. Brown,
121 ,Mo. 353, 25 S.W. 1108 (1894); O'Donnell v. Penney, 17 R.I. 164, 20 A. 305 (1890);.
Klapman v. Hook, 206 S.C. 51, 32 S.E. (2d) 882 (1944); Hummel v. Young, 1 Utah (2d)
237, 265 P. (2d) 410 (1953). Chew v. Morton, IO Watts (50 Pa.) 321 (1840), expresses the
same policy without the use of -the evidentiary terminology. Rosen v. Ihler, 267 Wis.
220, 64 N.W. (2d) 845 (1954), declares that long acquiescence raises a presumption of the
true line which cannot be overcome by recent surveys. Cf. Diehl v. Zanger, 39 Mich. 601
(1878).
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ed short of litigation, a point must be recognized where the location becomes binding. After the requisite period of acquiescence
the line acquiesced in becomes conclusive in the sense that it has
been given an adequate location on the ground, not because there
is no other place where a surveyor, applying the documents of
title, might locate it. The same thought may lie behind the statement that a line long acquiesced in, especially if it is marked oy
a fence, is better evidence of the "true line" than later surveys
after the original monuments have disappeared.100 It is better evidence only because the court says it is, and the court says it is
because it is at least an acceptable basis for .getting the question
settled once and for all. Such a rationale is not essentially different from the explanation of acquiescence in terms of an agreement.
The thought of acquiescence as prescriptive, nevertheless, is
pervasive. This in turn leaves doubt about its relation to the doctrine of adverse possession. It is startling how often courts, although speaking in terms of acquiescence, have not made it clear
which doctrine they were applying or even whether they recognize any difference between them.101 In other cases, some of which
have come from the same courts that on other occasions have
confused the doctrines, the separate existence or varying requirements of the two doctrines have been expressly declared. 102 Numerous other cases could be cited which are to the same effect
because of the separate application or consideration in each of
them of both doctrines. There are clear indications in several
states of the acceptance of a more liberal acquiescence rule as an
escape from the controversial proposition that possession to a

100 See Rosen v. Ihler, 267 Wis. 220 at 226, 64 N.W. (2d) 845 (1954). See also "The
Cooley Dictum," p. 526 infra.
101 Shaw v. Williams, (Fla. 1951) 50 S. (2d) 125; Ginther v. Duginger, 6 Ill. (2d) 474, 129
N.W. (2d) 147 (1955); Palmer v. Dosch, 148 Ind. 10, 47 N;E. 176 (1897); Klinkner v.
Schmidt, 114 Iowa 695, 87 N.W. 661 (1901); Rice v. Shoemaker, (Ky. 1956) 286 S.W. (2d)
523; Vogel v. Gruenhagen, 238 Minn. 247, 56 N.W. (2d) 427 (1953); Bernier v. Preckel,
60 N.D. 549, 236 N.W. 243 (1931); Vermont Marble Co. v. Eastman, 91 Vt. 425, 101 A.
151 (1917); Lindley v. Johnston, 42 Wash. 257, 84 P. 822 (1906). Cf. Marek v. Jelinek, 121
Minn. 468, 141 N.W. 788 (1913).
102,Dierssen v. Nelson, 138 Cal. 394, 71 P. 456 (1903); Tietjen v. Dobson, 170 Ga.
123, 152 S.E. 222 (1930); Schlender v. Maretoli, 140 Kan. 533, 37 P. (2d) 933 (1934); Stacy
v. Alexander, 143 Ky. 152, 136 S.W. 150 (1911); Faught v. Holway, 50 Me. 24 (1861);
Warner v. Noble, 286 Mich. 654, 282 N.W. 855 (1938); Lewis v. Smith, 187 Okla. 404,
103 P. (2d) 512 (1940); Miles v. Pennsylvania Coal Co., 245 Pa. 94, 91 A. 211 (1914);
Klapman v. Hook, 206 S.C. 51, 32 S.E. (2d) 882 (1944); Carstensen v. Brown, 32 Wyo.
491, 236 P. 517 (1925). Cf. Lamm v. Hardigree, 188 Okla. 378, 109 P. (2d) 225 (1941),
where the two rules were confused.
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boundary line in the mistaken belief that such line is the true
line may prevent such possession from being adverse; 103 or as an
escape from an unduly restrictive privity requirement. 104
It has been said that mutuality of acquiescence is required.
But this does not mean that the parties must be equally active in
its manifestation. Sometimes the claim of one owner to a line on
the ground or his assent to it as a boundary will be obvious, and
the problem will center on the role of his neighbor. Courts have
insisted that mutuality requires certain knowledge by the latter of
the farmer's conduct. A case cannot be made against him if he did
not know of the existence of a line or the occupation of his neighbor according to it, 105 or even if he did not know of his neighbor's claim or purpose.106 It has been indicated that the circumstances may be such as to impute knowledge to him. 107 The implication is clear that where knowledge is present, acquiescence
by one of the parties may consist only of his silence for the required period.108 The latter conclusion may be acceptable if it
means that the inactivity of one party with knowledge of his
neighbor's activity raises an inference or a presumption of assent
to or recognition of the line established by his neighbor. But if
it is carried to the extent of precluding any rebuttal of such a pre-

103 Handorf v. Hoes, 121 Iowa 79, 95 N.W. 226 (1903); Warner v. Noble, 286 Mich.
654, 282 N.W. 855 (1938); Klapman v. Hook, 206 S.C. 51, 32 S.E. (2d) 882 (1944); Carstensen
v. Brown, 32 Wyo. 491, 236 P. 517 (1925).
104 Hanlon v. Ten Hove, 235 Mich. 227, 209 N.W. 169 (1926). A remarkable use of
the acquiescence doctrine has been made in California. There payment of taxes is required
on land adversely possessed. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. (Deering, 1953) §325. A problem arises
in boundary cases in proving that a particular tract on which taxes have been paid included all land embraced within the alleged boundary, since tbe definition of the land
assessed is of course in terms of written descriptions. The acquiescence doctrine is used
to modify a description according to a boundary established by acquiescence, but of
course without changing ,the written description in fact. Taxes are therefore to be regarded as paid on all land lying within the boundaries so established, and title to such
land can ripen by adverse possession. Dierssen v. Nelson, 138 Cal. 394, 71 P. 456 (1903);
Price v. De Reyes, 161 Cal. 484, 119 P. 893 (1911). See also Edgeller v. Johnston, 74 Idaho
359, 262 P. (2d) 1006 (1953). This does not mean that acquiescence can serve only this
limited purpose in California, for there are many cases, including those just cited, which
recognized acquiescence as a separate ground for tlie determination of boundaries.
105 Maes v. Olmstead, 247 Mich. 180, 225 N.W. 583 (1929); Hakanson v. Manders,
158 Neb. 392, 63 N.W. (2d) 436 (1954); Ward v. Rodriguez, 43 N:M. 191, 88 P. (2d) 277
(1939); Silsby and Co. v. Kinsley, 89 Vt. 263, 95 A. 634 (1915).
106 Connell v. Clifford, 39 Colo. 121, 88 P. 850 (1907); De Viney v. Hughes, 243
Iowa 1!188, 55 N.W. (2d) 478 (1952); Nelson v. DaRouch, 87 Utah 457, 50 P. (2d) 273
(1935); State v. Vanderkoppel, 45 Wyo. 432, 19 P. (2d) 955 (1933).
107 Silsby and Co. v. Kinsley, 89 Vt. 263, 95 A. 634 (1915). Cf. Atkins v. Reagan, 244
Iowa 1387, 60 N.W. (2d) 790 (1953).
108 Hakanson v. Manders, 158 Neb. 392, 63 N.W. (2d) 436 (1954), where the court so
stated; Messer v. Oestreich, 52 Wis. 684, IO N.W. 6 (1881).
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sumption, the result can hardly be accepted in vindication 0£ a
requirement 0£ mutuality of acquiescence. To the extent that
mutuality is insisted upon, any prescriptive theory of acquiescence
is inappropriate. At least there is normally no requirement of
knowledge by one party of the adverse possession of the other.
Noting further the contrast between acquiescence and adverse
possession, although possession by one or both parties is frequently present, and may be regarded as evidence of acquiescence,1011
it has been held not to be req-qired of either party,110 or if present
it need not be continuous. But since a boundary by acquiescence
may be regarded as one kind of practical location on the ground,
it is essential that its precise location be apparent.111 If this is not
shown by the possessory acts of the parties, the line must somehow
be marked by monuments.11 2 This does not require artificial
monuments, however, and a road, 113 river, 114 trees and shrubbery, 115 an encroaching building,116 or even a ditch, 117 may suffice. 118 There are indications that some courts will allow possession
by the parties to serve this purpose in the absence of monuments,
even though possession is not otherwise necessary. 119 Alleged
boundaries have been marked by fences or the like in the great
majority of cases, but some liberality has been shown in regard to
the manner of marking, and lines have been approved which
were marked by a single monument120 or by monuments at their
termini. 121
109 Tietjen v. Dobson, 170 Ga. 123, 152 S.E. 222 (1929).
110 Watt v. Ganahl, 34 Ga. 290 (1866); Stacy v. Alexander, 143 Ky. 152, 136 S.W.
150 (1911); Brown v. Edson, 23 Vt. 435 (1851); Gwynn v. Schwartz, 32 W.Va. 487, 9 S.E.
880 (1889).
111 Scott v. Slater, 42 Wash. (2d) 366, 255 P. (2d) 377 (1953).
112Trimpl v. Meyer, 246 Iowa 1245, 71 N.W. (2d) 437 (1955); Beckman v. Metzger,
(Okla. 1956) 299 P. (2d) 152; Miles v. Pennsylvania Coal Co., 245 Pa. 94, 91 A. 211 (1914).
113 Quade v. Pillard, 135 Iowa 359, 112 N.W. 646 (1907).
114 Griffith v. Murray, 166 Iowa 380, 147 N.W. 855 (1914).
115-Renwick v. Noggle, 247 Mich. 150, 225 N.W. 535 (1929).
116Atkins v. Reagan, 244 Iowa 1387, 60 N.W. (2d) 790 (1953).
117Vander Zyl v. Muilenberg, 239 Iowa 73, 29 N.W. (2d) 412 (1948).
118 Tarver v. Naman, (Tex. Civ. App. 1954) 265 S.W. (2d) 852, permitted an unmarked
projection of a fence. Contra: Lane v. Jacobs, 166 App. iDiv. 182, 152 N.Y.S. 605 (1915);
Grants Pass Land and Water Co. v. Brown, 168 Cal. 456, 143 P. 754 (1914).
119 Muchenberger v. Santa Monica, 206 Cal. 635, 275 P. 803 (1929); Gildea v. Warren,
~73 Mich. 28, 138 N.W. 232 (1912). Cf. Beckman v. Metzger, (Okla. 1956) 299 P. (2d) 152.
120 Havlik v. Freeman, 214. Ark. 761, 218 S.W. (2d) 364 (1949); Carr v. Schomberg,
104 Cal. App. (2d) 850, 232 P. (2d) 597 (1951); Breakey v. Woolsey, 149 Mich. 86, 112
N.W. 719 (1907).
· 121Frericks v. Sorensen, 113 Cal. App. (2d) 759, 248 P. {2d) 949 ·(1952); Needham v•.
~ollamer, 94 Cal. App. {2d) 609, 211 P. (2d) 308 (1949). Cf. Truett v. Adams, 66 Cal. 218,
5 P. 96 (1884), in which it does not appear what or where the landmarks were.
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If acquiescence is regarded as evidence from which an agreement may be inferred, it must be decided whether the special
requirements for boundary agreements, such as uncertainty about
the true boundary and absence of mistake, are applicable. The
force of the mistake rule in the acquiescence cases is separately
considered below. In regard to uncertainty, the most notable
fact is that this requirement is seldom mentioned. Obviously,
many courts which presume or infer an agreement also presume
the uncertainty upon which an agreement must be founded. 122
This presumption is a necessary corollary of a fictional presumption of an initial agreement, but not of acquiescence as itself
constituting an agreement implied from conduct. In any event,
in many cases the circumstances existing when the acquiescence
began are unknO"wn, and no point is made of this fact. It has
been held in fact that neither a dispute nor uncertainty is required in acquiescence cases.123 In several cases, however, courts
have held that uncertainty cannot be inferred where there is
proof to the contrary,124 or seemed to say that lack of proof of
uncertainty is fatal to the proof of acquiescence. 125 Similarly,
the courts are divided on the effect of knowledge by the parties
that the line acquiesced in was not the true line. 126 The courts
holding that such knowledge precludes a line by acquiescence
are undoubtedly concerned about the same policy which gave
rise to the requirement of uncertainty in the boundary-agreement cases; that is, that the parties cannot transfer title to land
informally. Holdings to the contrary, as well as holdings that
there is no requirement of uncertainty, probably further reflect

122 The California court expressly so stated. Hannah v. Pogue, 23 Cal. (2d) 849, 147
P. (2d) 572 (1944); Board of Trustees v. Miller, 54 Cal. App. 102, 201 P. 952 (1921).
123 Tritt v. Hoover, 116 Mich. 4, 74 N.W. 177 (1898); Sherman v. Kane, 86 N.Y.
57 (1881); Lewis v. Smith, 187 Okla. 404, 103 P. (2d) 512 (1940).
124 Clapp v. Churchill, 164 Cal. 741, 130 P. 1061 (1913). Cf. Silva v. Azevedo, 178
Cal. 495, 173 P. 929 (1918), where the court distinguished Clapp v. Churchill.
125 Warwick v. Ocean Pond Fishing Club, 206 Ga. 680, 58 S.E. (2d) 383 (1950), which
is especially surprising since the acquiescence rule in that state is based on a statute
[Ga. Code Ann. (1955) §85-1602]; Home Owners' Loan Corp. v. Dudley, 105 Utah 208,
141 P. (2d) 160 (1943), where there was also some question about whether the parties
recognized the alleged line as the true line; Carstensen v. Brown, 32 Wyo. 491, 236 P.
517 (1925).
126 Holding that this precludes a line by acquiescence: Nathan v. Dierssen, 134 Cal.
282, 66 P. 485 (1901); McRae Land & Timber Co. v. Zeigler, (Fla. 1953) 65 S. (2d) 876;
Tripp v. Bagley, 7~ Utah 57, 276 P. 912 (1928). Cf. Lind v. Hustad, 147 Wis. 56, 132
N.W. 753 (1911). Holding that such knowledge makes no difference: McAvoy v. Saunders,
161 Iowa 651, 143 N.W. 548 (1913); Di Santo v. De Bellis, 55 R.I. 433, 182 A. 488 (1935).
Cf. Adams v. Child, 28 Nev. 169, 88 P. 1087 (1905); 'McCoy v. Hance, 28 Pa. 149 (1857).
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the influence of prescriptive notions, under which the location
of any true line is immaterial.
We should not be surprised to find that some courts have
characterized the practical location of boundaries by acquiescence
by simple and casual references to estoppel.127 All of these courts
have on other occasions offered one or the other or both of the
rationales mentioned above. It is obvious that estoppel is used
here in its loosest sense and probably again signifies the failure
to discover or articulate the real interests or policy to be served.
The same inference is suggested by the random use by a single
court of more than one of the three alternative theories. These
references to estoppel do not mean that the typical requirements of that doctrine will be imposed nor that the results are
merely equitable. It is assumed that the legal title is affected,
but only one of these courts has expressly declared this to be
so.12s
Here finally are several miscellaneous requirements which
have been imposed in one or more cases. It has been held that
the doctrine is not available against the state or its instrumentalities,129 although in another case in the same state a city
was held bound by acquiescence; 130 that one cannot acquiesce
who is non compos mentis;131 that a land contract purchaser
in possession is competent to acquiesce so as to bind the successors to the legal title; 182 and obviously that there can be no
practical location of a boundary where the lands of the parties are
not contiguous.188
No attempt will be made here to recite the limitless variety
of evidence, mostly circumstantial, which has been found relevant in proving recognition of or acquiescence in a line as a
boundary. As previously noted, in many cases the reports do not
reveal all of the facts which produced a judgment in the court
below.
127a3rown v. Leete, (C.C.Nev. 1880) 2 F. 440; Columbet v. Pacheco, 48 Cal. 395 (1874);
Henderson v. Dennis, 177 Ill. 547, 53 N.'E. 65 (1898); Curless v. State, 172 Ind. 257, 87
N.E. 129 (1909); Turner v. Baker, 64 ,Mo. 218 (1876); Hakanson v. 'Manders, 158 Neb.
392, 63 N.W. (2d) 436 (1954); Wood v. Bapp, 41 S.D. 195, 169 N.W. 518 (1918); Eubanks
v. Buckley, 16 Wash. (2d) 24, 132 P. (2d) 353 (1942).
128 Turner v. Baker, 64 Mo. 218 (1876), where the court said that this was a special
sort of estoppel confined to cases of this kind.
129 Herrick v. Moore, 185 Iowa 828, 169 N.W. 741 (1918).
180 Corey v. Fort Dodge, 118 Iowa 742, 92 N.W. 704 (1902).
181 Santee v. Uhlenhopp, 184 Iowa 1131, 169 N.W. 321 (1918).
182 Sheldon v. Perkins, 37 Vt. 550 (1865).
133Cavanaugh v. Jackson, 91 Cal. 580, 27 P. 931 (1891).
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Obviously the courts need to think out more carefully what
they mean to make of acquiescence. Especially they need to decide whether it is to be worked into the pattern of practical location or whether it is some sort of prescription. The specific requirements of acquiescence are not all consistent with either
view. Obviously a court cannot decide what acquiescence is before deciding what it is for. Nor can the courts work with acquiescence as a kind of practical location without forming a clearer idea of what practical location is all about. This may require
the discarding of some prevailing concepts, analogies, and terminology.
A striking example of the helplessness of a court in the face
of its own and other diverse precedents and dicta is to be found
in the latest Illinois case.134 The court there does not make clear
the relation of acquiescence either to parol agreements or to
adverse possession. Where one in that state relies on acquiescence
for less than the statutory period, he may have to meet the requirements for express boundary agreements, including proof
of uncertainty and absence of mistake. Where acquiescence exceeds the statutory period, it is not clear whether this has any
significance except as proof of adverse possession.
Effect of Mistake

The problem of mistake is seldom raised where acquiescence
alone is relied on. It can enter these cases, however, through a
court's attempt to adapt them to the parol agreement doctrine;
and it can also enter from another quarter where a court has
not yet defined an acquiescence doctrine separable from adverse
possession. Where a court is thinking in an adverse possession
context, the question may be put in terms of whether the parties,
during their acquiescence, were claiming only to the true line
as defined in their deeds, wherever that might be. But in either
case the meaning of mistake must be essentially the same; that
is, the question is over the effect of an allegation and proof that
the parties' acquiescence in a line was founded on a mistaken
belief that the line was the true line. Objection may be taken
to this statement of the question because it fails to take account
of the subtle distinction which has appeared in the application
of the mistake rule in the parol agreement cases. But such a dis134

Ginther v. Duginger, 6

m.

(2d) 474, 129 N.E. (2d) 147 (1955).
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tinction may seem unrealistic and especially difficult to apply
where the ground for determining a boundary is in terms of
acquiescence alone. The only way the distinction could be meaningfully drawn would be in some such terms as these: Did the
parties acquiesce in a line solely because of their belief, based on
such facts as were available regarding their boundary, that such
line was the true line, or were they in dispute or in doubt about
the true line at the beginning of their acquiescence and perhaps
throughout its continuance? At any rate there is no sign that
such a distinction has been recognized in the few cases in which
the question of mistake was raised. In several cases the courts
have simply stated that mistake is immaterial.135 Several other
courts, however, have indicated without· explanation that the effect of acquiescence is vitiated by mistake. 136 The position of the
Texas court to this effect is surprising in view of the fact that
it is one of the few courts which have expressly rejected the mistake rule in cases of express boundary agreements. 137 The Missouri
court has held that there can be no inference of an agreement
from an occupation to a line on the supposition that it was the
true line, 138 the presumption being that the party in possession
intended to claim only to the true line; 139 but if acquiescence in
the line continues for the statutory period, the presumption is
reversed and the parties will ·be bound. 140 The position of the

135 Sneed v. Osborn, 25 Cal. 619 (1864); Nusbickel v. Stevens Ranch Co., 187 Cal.
15, 200 P. 651 (1921); 'Miller v. Mills County, 111 Iowa 654, 82 N.W. 1038 (1900); Leeka
v. Chambers, 232 Iowa 1043, 6 N.W. (2d) 837 (1942); Chew v. Morton, 10 Watts (50 Pa.)
321 (1840); Carstensen v. Brown, 32 Wyo. 491, 236 P. 517 (1925). In Anderson v. Buchanan,
139 Iowa 676, 116 N.W. 694 (1908), and Bradley v. Burkhart, 139 Iowa 323, 115 N.W.
597 (1908), the Iowa court also stated that it did not matter that the parties claimed no
more than the land given them by their deeds.
136 Gulf Oil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 137 Tex. 59, 152 S.W. (2d) 711 (1941); White
v. Ward, 35 W.Va. 418, 14 S.E. 22 (1891). Cf. Glenn v. Whitney, 116 Utah 267, 209 P. (2d)
257 (1949); Ginther v. Duginger, 6 Ill. (2d) 474, 129 N.E. (2d) 147 (1955), where it is
not clear that :the court was considering acquiescence separately from a parol agreement;
Wood v. Bapp, 41 S.D. 195, 169 N.W. 518 (1918), where the court said that mistake would
defeat an express agreement, but that if the parties discovered the mistake and thereafter
continued to acquiesce for the statutory period in the line agreed on, they would be
bound, with some doubt left whether this was founded on the acquiescence doctrine
or on adverse possession. In White v. Ward, supra, acquiescence was pleaded as a basis
for estoppel, and the court responded that estoppel could not be .founded on a bona fide
mistake.
137 Cooper v. Austin, 58 Tex. 494 (1883), cited note 69 supra.
138Schad v. Sharp, 95 'Mo. 573, 8 S.W. 549 (1888); Jacobs v. Moseley, 91 Mo. 457,
4 s.w. 135 (1886).
139 Three Way Land Co. v. Wells, (Mo. 1945) 185 S.W. (2d) 795; Tillman v. Hutcherson, 348 Mo. 473, 154 S.W. (2d) 104 (1941).
140 Mothershead v. Milfeld, 361 Mo. 704, 236 S.W. (2d) 343 (1951); Tillman v. Hutcher-

1958]

519

LOCATION OF BOUNDARIES

Missouri court is in contrast to those which have used the doctrine
of acquiescence as an escape from the mistake requirements of
adverse possession.141
If a court accepts the mistake rule when talking about boundary agreements, but not when talking about acquiescence, and
so long as we cannot know how a court will choose between these
overlapping concepts, further doubts are raised about whether
a decision can be predicted in any case.

III.

EsTOPPEL

In approaching the cases in which courts have resolved the
problem of practical location in terms of estoppel, one may wonder whether there is any benefit to be gained by an inquiry into
the meaning and requirements of estoppel in other contexts. It
is only natural to assume that such an inquiry would aid in the
analysis of estoppel in the present context by providing a standard for judgment or at least a basis for comparison. But in looking at estoppel generally one may come to doubt whether any
standard is to be found. Attempts have been made to define or
to state the requirements for one major area of the doctrine,
estoppel in pais, of equitable origin.142 There must be a representation of fact, by one who knows the true facts, to one who
does not know, and a substantial change of position by the latter
in reliance thereon. But to what extent have these requirements
in application been redefined, distorted, or ignored? And what
is to be said about estoppel by deed, estoppel of a tenant to deny
his landlord's title, or of a bailee to deny his bailor's title, to
mention but several of the miscellany to be found under the general head? There can be no further pursuit here of a common
thread, other than to state the impression that estoppel will be
invoked in diverse situations where a court finds it inequitable
or contrary to some policy to allow one who has taken a position
of some legal significance later to change that position. Yet an
adequate study of estoppel in the boundary cases cannot be made
son, 348 Mo. 473, 154 S.W. (2d) 104 (1941). This analysis can ·be significant only on the
assumption that the Missouri court would give some effect to acquiescence for less than
the statutory period. If acquiescence must be for the statutory period in any case, mistake
under this view becomes immaterial. In the Mothershead case the court referred only to
long acquiescence.
141 See note 103 supra.
142 3 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE,

ed., 602 et seq. (1913).

5th ed., §805 (1941);

BIGELOW, EsTOPPEL,

6th
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entirely out of context. References to other applications of the
doctrine, particularly to the typical estoppel in pais, will be made
where this seems helpful in discovering the courts' objectives in
the boundary cases.
Attention should be directed first to cases in which the principles of estoppel in pais can be easily invoked. These are cases
in which a landowner makes positive representations to his neighbor about the location of their common boundary. Such cases
stand somewhat apart from the objectives of this study, but
they should not be passed without some comment. Where there
has been a change of position in reliance on such representation,
estoppel has almost invariably been applied.143 The change of
position usually consists of erecting valuable improvements, but
in a number of cases the mere purchase of land affected by the
boundary was sufficient.144 It may be clear in the latter cases that
the purchaser acquired his land believing that the boundary was
as it was represented; but it is doubtful whether the proof shows
that he would not have purchased but for the representations.
No point has been made of this, however. The stated requirements of estoppel in pais include the requirement that the party
making the representation shall have knowledge of the true facts
or that the circumstances are sufficient to impute such knowledge.
But it seems that this requirement is not always adhered to even
in cases not involving boundaries. 145 At any rate, in the boundary
cases, although several courts have refused to estop a defendant
who asserted a line with a good faith belief that it was the true
boundary,146 the scienter requirement has more frequently been
143 Allyn v. Schultz, 5 Ariz. 152, 48 P. 960 (1897); Grants Pass Land and Water Co.
v. Brown, 168 Cal. 456, 143 P. 754 (1914); Pitcher v. Dove, 99 Ind. 175 (1884); Ross v.
Ferree, 95 Iowa 604, 64 N.W. 683 (1895); Martin v. Hampton Grocery Co., 256 Ky. 401,
76 S.W. (2d) 32 (1934); Liederbach v. Pickett, 199 'Minn. 554, 273 N.W. 77 (1937); Small
v. Robbins, 33 Nev. 288, 110 P. 1128 (1910); Clark v. Hindman, 46 Ore. 67, 79 P. 56 (1905);
Merriwether v. Larmon, 35 Tenn. 447 (1856); Spiller v. Scribner, 36 Vt. 245 (1863); Rippey
v. Harrison, 66 Wash. 109, 119 P. 178 (1911); Haag v. Gorman, 203 Wis. 346, 234 N.W.
337 (1931). Cf. Howell v. Kelly, 129 Kan. 543, 283 P. 500 (1930); Mowers v. Evers, 117
Mich. 93, 75 N.W. 290 (1898).
144Allyn v. Schultz, 5 Ariz. 152, 48 P. 960 (1897); Grants Pass Land and Water Co.
v. Brown, 168 Cal. 456, 143 P. 754 (1914); Rowell v. Weinemann, 119 Iowa 256, 93 N.W.
279 (1903); Merriwether v. Larmon, 35 Tenn. 447 (1856); Spiller v. Scribner, 36 Vt. 245
(1863); Rippey v. Harrison, 66 Wash. 109, 119 P. 178 (1911). Cf. Mowers v. Evers, 117
Mich. 93, 75 N.W. 290 (1898).
145 BIGELOW, ·ESTOPPEL, 6th ed., 663 et seq. (1913); 3 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE,
5th ed., §809 (1941). Pomeroy says that such a requirement is less likely to be imposed
where estoppel is founded on affirmative conduct rather than mere acquiescence or
silence, and that the result is an application of the two-innocent-persons doctrine.
146 Cheeney v. Nebraska and C. Stone Co., (C.C. Colo. 1890) 41 F. 740; Quick v.
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ignored. 147 Of course where a plaintiff's change of position has
not been in reliance on anytp.ing done or omitted by the defendant, there is no room for estoppel.148
A striking application of the doctrine has been made in cases
involving only silence on the part of one landowner in the face
of expenditures by his neighbor, which were made on certain
assumptions by the latter as to the correct boundary.149 These
cases are all the more striking because in most of them the estopped party shared the belief of his neighbor as to the proper
location of their boundary.150
The cases last considered may suggest that the courts in applying estoppel in boundary disputes are concerned with something
more than the prevention of inequitable results in particular
cases. They may serve as a transition into a larger mass of cases
which are fully meaningful only in relation to the practical location of boundaries by parol agreement or acquiescence.
Mention has been made of some courts' use of estoppel to
explain decisions on facts which show nothing more than typical
practical locations by other accepted methods. 151 There may be
objection to such a practice on the ground that it distorts the
meaning of estoppel. But certainly these are cases in which parties

Nitschelm, 139 III. 251, 28 N.E. 926 (1891); Faulkner v. Lloyd, (Ky. 1952) 253 S.W. (2d)
972. Cf. Pitcher v. Dove, 99 Ind. 175 (1884); Spiller v. Scribner, 36 Vt. 245 (1863).
147 Harper v. Learned, 199 La. 398, 6 S. (2d) 326 (1942): Benz v. St. Paul, 89 Minn.
31, 93 N.W. 1038 (1903); Small v. Robbins, 33 Nev. 288, 110 P. 1128 (1910); Clark v.
Hindman, 46 Ore. 67, 79 P. 56 (1905); Louks v. Kenniston, 50 Vt. 116 (1877); Rippey
v. Harrison, 66 Wash. 109, 119 P. 178 (1911).
148 Keel v. Covey, 206 Okla. 128, 241 P. (2d) 954 (1952); Thomas v. Harlan, 27 Wash.
(2d) 512, 178 P. (2d) 965 (1947). Cf. Coming v. Troy Iron &: Nail Factory, 44 N.Y. 577
(1871), in which recovery of land was allowed on the finding that it would not interfere
with the defendant's valuable improvements. There will be no estoppel if the defendant
did not know of the expenditures until after they were completed. Trimpl v. Meyer,
246 Iowa 1245, 71 N.W. (2d) 437 (1955).
149 Deidrich v. Simmons, 75 Ark. 400, 87 S.W. 649 (1905); Kerr v. Hitt, 75 III. 51
(1874); Minear v. Keith Furnace Co., 213 Iowa 663, 239 N.W. 584 (1931); Corey v. Fort
Dodge, 118 Iowa 742, 92 N.W. 704 (1902); McClintic v. f[)avis, 228 S.C. 378, 90 S.E. (2d)
364 (1955). Cf. Roetzel v. Rusch, 172 Okla. 465, 45 P. (2d) 518 (1935); Tyree v. Gosa, 11
Wash. (2d) 572, 119 P. (2d) 926 (1941), where such a result was not reached because the
plaintiff verbally protested against the defendant's activities. Contra: Cottrell v. Pickering,
32 Utah 62, 88 P. 696 (1907), where the court insisted on the strict requirements of
estoppel in pais. Cf. Mullaney v. Duffy, 145 Ill. 559, 33 N.E. 750 (1893); Hass v. Plautz,
56 Wis. 105, 14 N.W. 65 (1882); Warner v. Fountain, 28 Wis. 405 (1871).
150 Cf. Dorfman v. Lieb, 102 N.J. Eq. 492, 141 A. 581 (1928), where the court said
that equity will not relieve against a mutual mistake, but nevertheless ordered the
defendant to convey ,to the plaintiff the land claimed by him upon payment by the latter
of its value.
151 See text at notes 47 and 127 supra.
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who have taken a position are prevented from changing it; and
reference can be made again to other applications of estoppel
which do not meet the more precise requirements of estoppel in
pais. The main objection to such a practice, however, is that it
serves merely to cover a court's failure to bring to light the real
ground for decision. A primary purpose of this whole study is
to discover a rationale for practical location. If the concepts of
parol agreements and acquiescence are not wholly adequate for
this purpose, a resort to estoppel gets us no further. Particular
reference should be made to an Alabama case in which there
was an informal boundary agreement and the erection of a fence
and acquiescence and possession in accordance with it for thirty
years. 152 The court invoked estoppel to prevent a denial of the
validity of this boundary. This is of special significance because
that court had not previously recognized boundaries by agreement or acquiescence. If this case is followed, it may be possible
to determine boundaries by either means in the guise of
estoppel. 153
Courts have invoked estoppel in favor of a landowner who
changed his position in reliance on conduct by an adjoining
owner, such as erecting a fence, indicating the latter's position in
regard to their boundary. 154 No representations were expressly
made, but could be said to have been implied by conduct. These
cases are referred to here, rather than in relation to the situation
mentioned three paragraphs above, because of the difficulty in
distinguishing them from other cases involving long mutual
acquiescence in a boundary, but which also had the additional
feature that one of the parties in each dispute made valuable
improvements in reliance on the boundary acquiesced in, a fact
152 Turner v. De
153 In a group of

Priest, 205 Ala. 313, 87 S. .370 (1921).
early Tennessee cases it was held that where one takes a grant of
unsurveyed land from the state and then marks out boundaries, these will be binding
on the state and also by estoppel on the grantee in favor of his later grantees. Yal'borough
v. Abernathy, 19 Tenn. 413 (1838); Singleton v. Whiteside, 13 Tenn. 18 (1833); Davis'
Lessee v. Smith & Tapley, 9 Tenn. 496 (1831). This has been designated as the "remarking
doctrine." Failure to meet even the minimum estoppel requirement of a change in position in reliance on the marked boundary leaves such a rule as essentially no more than
a special kind of practical location. A similar rule has been applied in North Carolina
against a grantor who, at the time or after his conveyance, marks the boundaries of the
land conveyed. Watford v. Pierce, 188 N.C. 430, 124 S.E. 838 (1924); Barker v. Southern
Ry. Co., 125 N.C. 596, 34 S.E. 701 (1899).
154 Hart v. Worthington, 238 Iowa 1205, 30 N.W. (2d) 306 (1947); Harper v. Learned,
199 La. 398, 6 S. (2d) 326 (1942); Colby v. Norton, 19 Me. 412 (1841); Fitch v. Walsh, 94
Neb. 32, 142 N.W. 293 (1913); Noble Gold Mines Co. v. Olsen, 57 Nev. 448, 66 P. (2d)
1005 (1937); Morrison v. Howell, 37 Pa. 58 (1860); Hefner v. Downing, 57 Tex. 576 (1882).
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which the courts regarded as bearing on the outcome.155 Of
special interest are several New Jersey cases where the practical
location of streets and lot lines consistent therewith, after long
acquiescence and the making of improvements, became binding
on the parties affected. 156 The court said that acquiescence for
the statutory period was not required, but initially did not apply
the label of estoppel. At length the court indicated that this rule
was not confined to cases involving streets and was indeed one of
estoppel,157 but reference was also made to the leading New York
case on boundaries by acquiescence.158 New Jersey also has not
otherwise recognized boundaries by agreement or acquiescence.
The largest group of cases invoking estoppel are those which
show practical locations by express or implied oral agreements,
but with the added feature that one of the parties made valuable
improvements in reliance on the line agreed on. 159 In some of
these cases there was also acquiescence for the statutory period; 160
but in others it is clear that a post-agreement period of acquiescence is not required. 161 The Washington court ha~ expressly
stated that an agreed line becomes binding either upon long
acquiescence or the making of improvements in reliance on it. 162
The Wisconsin court in fact seems to recognize agreed boundaries
only in terms of estoppel, with the making of improvements as

155 Bayhouse v. Urquides, 17 Idaho 286, 105 P. 1066 (1909); Midland Valley Railroad
v. Imler, 130 Okla. 79, 262 P. 1067 (1927); Kier v. Fahrenthold, (Tex.Civ.App. 1957) 299
S.W. (2d) 744. In the first two of these cases the courts did not use the word estoppel
to characterize the result.
156 Jackson v. Perrine, 35 N.J.L. 137 (1871); Smith v. The State, 23 N.J.L. 130 (1851);
Den d. Haring v. Van Houten, 22 N.J.L. 61 (1849).
157 Baldwin v. Shannon, 43 N.J.L. 596 (1881).
158 Baldwin v. Brown, 16 N.Y. 359 (1857).
159 Needham v. Collamer, 94 Cal.App. (2d) 609, 211 P. (2d) 308 (1949); Acosta v.
Gingles, 70 Fla. 13, 69 S. 717 (1915); Steidl v. Link, 246 Ill. 345, 92 N.E. 874 (1910); Bubacz
v. Kirk, 91 Ind. App. 479, 171 N.E. 492 (1930); Cheshire v. McCoy, 205 Iowa 474,218 N.W.
329 (1928); Evans v. Kunze, 128 Mo. 670, 31 S.W. 123 (1895); Trussel v. Lewis, 13 Neb.
415, 14 N.W. 155 (1882); Jackson ex dem. Goodrich v. Ogden, 7 Johns. (N.Y.) 238 (1810);
Burt v. Creppel, 5 Ohio Dec. Repr. 330 (1875); Glasscock v. Bradley, (Tex.Civ.App. 1941)
152 S.W. (2d) 439; Blackham v. Olsen, 51 Utah 124, 169 P. 156 (1917); Windsor v. Sarsfield,
66 Wash. 576, 119 P. 1112 (1912); Pickett v. Nelson, 71 Wis. 542, 37 N.W. 836 (1888).
Cf. Taylor v. Reising, 13 Idaho 226, 89 P. 943 (1907); Fisler v. Van Deusen, 158 App.
Div. 322, 143 N.Y.S. 386 (1913).
160 Bubacz v. Kirk, 91 Ind. App. 479, 171 N.'E. 492 (1930); Trussel v. Lewis, 13 Neb.
415, 14 N.W. 155 (1882).
161 Needham v. Collamer, 94 Cal.App. (2d) 609, 211 P. (2d) 308 (1949); German
v. Wilkin, 377 Ill. 515, 37 N.E. (2d) 155 (1941); Johnston v. -McFerren, 232 Iowa 305, 3
N.W. (2d) 136 (1942); Diggs v. Kurtz, 132 Mo. 250, 33 S.W. 815 (1896); Burt v. Creppel, 5
Ohio Dec. Repr. 330 (1875); Blackham v. Olsen, 51 Utah 124, 169 P. 156 (1917).
162 Windsor v. Sarsfield, 66 Wash. 576, 119 P. 1112 (1912).
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a necessary requirement. 163 A few courts have denied estoppel in
this situation because of the good faith, mistake, or lack of deception on the part of the party against whom estoppel was asserted. 164
The Wisconsin court ruled to the same effect, but in terms of
the requirement of a dispute or uncertainty and the mistake rule
in boundary agreements. 165 But this restriction is not imposed by
most of the courts which have applied estoppel either in the setting of parol boundary agreements or of acquiescence. It may be
inferred that where the circumstances are such as to call for estoppel, most courts are thereby also freed from the strictures of
the mistake rule in boundary agreements.
It will be seen that most of the estoppel cases require at least
a substantial change of position by the party alleging estoppel.
The presence in the facts of such a change of position adds an
equitable ground for decision to whatever general policy may also
be available and applicable in support of the practical location
of boundaries. The designation as estoppel of the principle involved may serve as a useful mark for classifying these cases on
the basis of that special feature in them that is different from the
common run of practical location cases. In this view, there is
little point in inquiring whether estoppel in these cases is altogether consistent with the ordinary principles of estoppel in
pais. Objection to this use of the doctrine would have to center
on the small emphasis which many courts place on the role of
the party estopped. But the term "estoppel" may serve for lack
of some other term which better conveys the meaning of what
has been done. The decisions themselves are not objectionable,
at least where the element of a changed position appears in addition to facts indicating a practical location by agreement or acquiescence, for the latter facts alone would justify the decisions.
Where there is a changed position in reliance on a line believed
to be the true line, but without any other features of practical
163 Peters v. Reichenbach, 114 Wis. 209, 90 N.W. 184 (1902); Hass v. Plautz, 56 Wis.
105, 14 N.W. 65 (1882); Cove v. White, 20 Wis. 425 (1866), 23 Wis. 282 (1868).
164 Proctor v. Putnam -Machine Co., 137 Mass. 159 (1884); Brewer v. Boston & Worcester R,R., 46 Mass. 478 (1843); Ward v. Dean, 69 -Minn.. 466, 72 N.W. 710 (1897);
Carstensen v. Brown, 32 Wyo. 491, 236 P. 517 (1925). In Cronin v. Gore, 38 Mich. 381
(1878), the Michigan court said :that good faith was a defense when reliance was on the
silence, rather than the representations, of a landowner. In Beardsley v. Crane, 52
Minn. 537, 54 N.W. 740 (1893), the Minnesota court stated its three-fold doctrine of
practical location, one ground of which is estoppel, stated in terms requiring knowledge
of the true line by the party estopped.
165 Hass v. Plautz, 56 Wis. 105, 14 N.W. 65 (1882). See also Proprietors of Liverpool
Wharf v. Prescott, 89 Mass. 494 (1863).
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location, the decision will be justified in some cases by the presence of a representation, by words or conduct, by the party estopped. This is pretty close to orthodox estoppel in pais. There
remain those few cases in which there is nothing to induce one
party's change of position except knowledge by the other party
that such change is taking place and then silence. Such decisions
may be debatable. The willingness of some courts to reach them
may reflect these courts' susceptibility to any available device for
the expeditious determination of boundaries. If there were some
simple, or at least clear, answer to the simple question, "Where
is my boundary?" the courts might not feel the need to be so
liberal with estoppel. At least the role of the party estopped has
not been ignored altogether. Here, as in other areas of practical
location, there must be some semblance of mutuality. The courts
have yet to say that one can make out a case of practical location
merely by proving that he unilaterally procured a survey and
built a house accordingly.

IV. OTHER RULES
Description v. Survey
In an earlier article166 an attempt was made to run down authority for a proposition I had at times encountered to the effect that lines surveyed on the ground prior to a conveyance
would control an inconsistent description in the deed based on
such survey. There is no need to go into all this again, but since
it savors of practical location, the rules encountered are here
briefly stated.
(1) One rule followed by a large number of courts concerns
a description which incorporates a plat, and requires that, if the
plat and the survey on which it was based conflict, the survey
must control. There is no requirement that the survey be marked
on the ground or that the parties know anything about it. Many
of the cases, however, show such knowledge, and show that the
survey in fact was marked, or other significant facts, such as reliance on it or acquiescence in it. Where these facts appear, the
same decisions might have been reached by application of one
or the· other of the doctrines of practical location already
considered.
(2) Several courts at an early date announced another rule
like the first, but broader in scope. If a survey is made prior to a
166J3rowder, "Boundaries: Description v. Survey,'' 53

'MICH.

L. REv. 647 (1955).
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conveyance, or the land intended for conveyance is otherwise
designated on the ground, the lines so designated will control
inconsistent calls in the deed. Here too it is not clear that the surveyed lines must be visibly marked, that the parties to the deed
must have participated in the survey, or even that they both must
know of it. Nor is certain protection provided for subsequent
purchasers who take without knowledge of the controlling facts.
In some of its applications the rule seems to accomplish a reformation for mutual mistake in the guise of construction. This
rule is not generally followed, and its status is not clear in those
states which at one time approved it.
(3) Practical location by common grantor. This is a designation
of a variant of the rule stated immediately above. It has crept into
the decisions in several states. If, where a grantor seeks to divide
his land into one or more parcels, he marks the dividing lines on
the ground, such lines will control any inconsistent calls in the
deed or deeds. Here too there is no clearly imposed requirement
that a grantee participate in or know what the grantor has done.
But in all of the cases the grantees either knew of the line at the
time of the conveyance or there was such acquiescence in the
line as to have constituted a practical location on the ground.
In addition to the cases cited in the earlier article as opposed
to these three rules, reference is also made to several cases which
have approached the question on the basis of practical location by
oral agreement, and which in effect are also opposed to the rules
stated either on the ground that the survey was unilateral and not
agreed to or acquiesced in; 167 that, since the survey took place
prior to the conveyance, the requirement of a dispute or uncertainty as the basis for agreement could not be satisfied; 168 or
that an agreement prior to a conveyance merges in the deed. 169
Further comment on these rules appears below under the
heading "VI. The Meaning of Practical Location."

The Cooley Dictum
In two early Michigan cases170 Justice Cooley asserted a principle of practical location the exact basis for which was not made
167 Ross v. Severance, 198 Wis. 489,
168 Taylor v. Board of Trustees, 185

224 N.W. 711 (1929).
Ga. 61, 194 S.E. 169 (1937); Lake Geneva Beach
Assn. v. Anderson, 246 Wis. 596, 18 N.W. (2d) 493 (1945).
169 Hicks v. Smith, 205 Ga. 614, 54 S.E. (2d) 407 (1949).
170 Diehl v. Zanger, 39 Mich. 601 at 605 (1878) (concurring opinion); Flynn v. Glenny,
51 Mich. 580 at 584, 17 N.W. 65 (1883).
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clear. He said that the principle applicable to conveyances by
government survey should be applied generally; that is, the controlling question is where the original landmarks were located,
notwithstanding an inconsistent plat or any claim that they were
located erroneously. Further, the best evidence of where they
were located is the practical location made at the time the original
monuments were presumably in place. For this reason old boundary fences are the best evidence of lot lines. He said further:
"It is also pure assumption that the original survey was mathematically correct. . . . Purchasers of town lots have a right
to locate them according to the stakes which they find planted
and recognized, and no subsequent survey can be allowed to
unsettle their lines. The question afterwards is not whether
the stakes were where they should have been in order to make
them correspond with the lot lines as they should be if the
platting were done with absolute accuracy, but it is whether
they were planted by authority, and the lots were purchased
and taken possession of in reliance upon them. If such was the
case they must govern, notwithstanding any errors in locating
them." 171
It is not clear from these statements how conclusive are lot lines
which "were planted by authority," unless the lots also "were
purchased and taken possession of in reliance on them." The first
of these thoughts, the planting of lines by authority, comes close
to the essence of practical location. It is a recognition of the unreliability of paper boundaries and the necessity for a practical
location which, when made, becomes binding. If so, it is noteworthy that Justice Cooley was able to see the practical location
problem in terms other than those of parol agreements. The
thought about purchasing and taking possession in reliance, however, smacks of estoppel, or perhaps acquiescence. In fact the
doctrine of acquiescence was expressly asserted in both of the
cases in which this dictum appears. And it is that doctrine which
seems to have predominated in later Michigan cases in which the
Cooley dictum has been cited.172 The present significance of this
dictum apart from the acquiescence doctrine is doubtful. The

171 Flynn v. Glenny, 51 Mich.
172 E.g., Escher v. Bender, 338

580 at 584, 17 N.W. 65 (1883).
Mich. 1, 61 N.W. (2d) 143 (1953); Marion v. Balsley,
195 Mich. 51, 161 N.W. 820 (1917); Veltmans v. Kurtz, 167 Mich. 412, 132 N.W. 1009
(1911); Breakey v. Woolsey, 149 Mich. 86, 112 N.W. 719 (1907); Husted v. Willoughby,
117 Mich. 56, 75 N.W. 279 (1898); White v. Peabody, 106 Mich. 144, 64 N.W. 41 (1895).

•

528

MICHIGAN LAw R.Evrnw

[ Vol. 56

original Michigan cases have been cited by other courts, but not
in support of the full import of the Cooley dictum.173

The Rule of Lerned v. Morrill 174
Several early New England cases held that if a deed calls
for monuments which have not been placed on the land at the
time of the conveyance, but which are later so placed by the
parties, the latter will be bound thereby, as if the monuments
existed at the time of the conveyance.175

An Omnibus Rule
The Washington court on occasion has stated the requirements of practical location in terms of a combination of all the
usual bases therefor, that is, if parties agree on a line and acquiesce
in it for a long period and improvements are made with reference
to it, they will be bound.176 The impression may be left that all
these elements are required in any case, but other cases in that
state show that an agreement acquiesced in,177 or acquiescence
alone, 178 or estoppel179 are separate and sufficient grounds for
decision.

No Practical Location

•

It may be interesting to note that, apart from arbitration
agreements or the use of acquiescence as evidence of a boundary,
courts in the following states have not recognized, either by
decision or dicta, the practical location of boundaries by agreement or acquiescence: Alabama, 180 Maryland, Massachusetts,181
New Jersey, North Carolina, and Virginia. Several of these courts,

173E.g., Flynn v. Glenny was cited in Turner v. Creech, 58 Wash. 439 at 443, 108
P. 1084 (1910), in support of the practical location of boundaries by a common grantor,
and in Richwine v. The Presbyterian Church, 135 Ind. 80 at 91, 34 N.E. 737 (1892), for
the doctrine of boundaries by acquiescence.
1742 N.H. 197 (1820).
175 Knowles v. Toothaker, 58 Me. 172 (1870); Cleaveland v. Flagg, 58 'Mass. 76 (1849).
Cf. Oliver v. Muncy, 262 Ky. 164, 89 S.W. (2d) 617 (1936). Contra: Cripe v. Coates, 124
Ind. App. 246, 116 N.E. (2d) 642 (1954).
176 Scott v. Slater, 42 Wash. (2d) 366, 255 P. (2d) 377 (1953); Mullally v. Parks, 29
Wash. (2d) 899, 190 P. (2d) 107 (1948).
177 Farrow v. Plancich, 134 Wash. 690, 236 P. 288 (1925).
178 Denny v. Northern Pacific Ry., 19 Wash. 298, 53 P. 341 (1898).
179 Rippey v. Harrison, 66 Wash. 109, 119 P. 178 (1911).
180 Cf. Turner v. De Priest, 205 Ala. 313, 87 S. 370 (1921).
181 Cf. the cases cited note 76 supra.

1958]

LOCATION OF BOUNDARIES

529

however, have recognized estoppel as a basis for the determination of boundaries.182
V.

STATUS OF SUBSEQUENT PURCHASERS

Relatively little has been said by the courts about the effect
of practical location by agreement, acquiescence, or estoppel,
upon the successors in interest of the original parties. Large
numbers of cases in effect bind subsequent purchasers, but without mention of the question. One reason for this may be the
inability of such purchasers to make out a case on the usual facts
for relief against the actions of their predecessors. That a practical
location will bind the parties thereto and their privies is the
usual assumption, and the only ground indicated for relieving the
privies is their qualification as bona fide purchasers for value
without notice of the located line. Accordingly it has been held
that they will be bound if they had knowledge of the line; 183 and
they will also be bound by constructive or inquiry notice, which
can be furnished by possession conforming to the line,184 by monuments marking the line, 185 or by improvements consistent with
the line. 186 One court held that a difference in the grade of land
and in the appearance of a sidewalk which crossed the line were
sufficient. 187 Cases without some such facts as these are not common; and if visible marking were required for practical location
even as between the original parties, as it probably should be, the
present problem would disappear.
Some courts have decided that successors in interest are bound

182 Cox v. Heuseman, 124 Va. 159, 97 S.E. 778 (1919). Cf. Turner v. De Priest, 205
Ala. 313, 87 S. 370 (1921); New Jersey cases cited notes 156, 157 supra.
183 Furlow v. Dunn, 201 Ark. 23, 144 S.W. (2d) 31 (1940); Kandlick v. Hudek, 365
Ill. 292, 6 N .E. (2d) 196 (1937).
184 Price v. De Reyes, 161 Cal. 484, 119 P. 893 (1911); Sheldon v. Atkinson, 38 Kan.
14, 16 P. 68 (1887); Kentucky Harlan Coal Co. v. Harlan Gas Coal Co., 245 Ky. 234, 53
S.W. (2d) 538 (1932); Thompson v. Borg, 90 Minn. 209, 95 N.W. 896 (1903); Box Elder
Livestock Co. v. Glynn, 58 Mont. 561, 193 P. 1117 (1920); '.Bartlett v. Young, 63 N.H.
265 (1884).
185 Paurley v. Harris, 75 Idaho 112, 268 P. (2d) 351 (1954); Kinsey v. Sattertlnvaite,
88 Ind. 342 (1882); Seberg v. Iowa Trust & Savings Bank, 141 Iowa 99, 119 N.W. 378
(1909); Carver v. Turner, 310 Ky. 99, 219 S.W. (2d) 409 (1949); Lynch v. Egan, 67 Neb.
541, 93 N.W. 775 (1903); Thiessen v. Wortltlngton, 41 Ore. 145, 68 P. 424 (1902); Hagey
v. Detweiler, 35 Pa. 409 (1860).
186 Miller v. Farmers' Bank and Trust Co., 104 Ark. 99, 148 S.W. 513 (1912); Campbell
v. Weisbrod, 73 Idaho 82, 245 P. (2d) 1052 (1952); Houston v. Sneed, 15 Tex. 307 (1855);
Roe v. Walsh, 76 Wash. 148, 135 P. 1031 (1913).
187 Concannon v. Blackman, 232 Iowa 722, 6 N.W. (2d) 116 (1942). Cf. Nitterauer v.
Pulley, 401 Ill. 494, 82 N.E. (2d) 643 (1948).
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without notice.188 Where the view is held that practical location
is not a conveyance, but only the application of a description to
the ground, a sort of construction of the deed,1 89 such a conclusion
is at least understandable. One court simply said that otherwise
the doctrine could not be effective.190 Where, after a boundary
agreement, title to the parcels affected become united, it has been
held that a subsequent grantee of one of the parcels takes according to the terms of his deed unaffected by the agreement. 191
It is an assumed and unquestioned corollary to the practical
location doctrine, or at least to any rule binding successors in
interest, that the benefit of any such location also runs to successors in interest. 192 Such is the import of the frequent statement
that when such a location has been effectively made, it attaches
in legal effect to the deeds of the parties as though expressly
described therein. 193 It has been held that a party to a boundary
agreement is estopped to deny it against a subsequent purchaser
from him of his lot. 194
The similarity between the doctrine of acquiescence and
adverse possession suggests the existence of a comparable tacking
problem. It has not been regarded as a problem in the acquiescence
cases, however, for it is scarcely ever mentioned, and quite generally it is tacitly allowed. One case has been found in which the
question was mentioned, and the court there held that a successor in interest can tack his period of acquiescence to that of his
predecessor.195

VI. THE MEANING OF PRACTICAL LOCATION
This dismal story of the courts' struggle to adapt inadequate
doctrines to reach a laudable objective falls short of revealing the
enorn;iity of the confusion which has been left in the wake of that
188 Needham v. Collamer, 94 Cal. App. (2d) 609, 211 P. (2d) 308 (1949); McGill v.
Dowman, 195 -Ga. 357, 24 S.E. (2d) 195 (1943) (applying statutory rule of acquiescence);
Osteen v. Wynn, 131 Ga. 209, 62 S.E. 37 (1908); Kesler v. Ellis, 47 Idaho 740, 278 P.
366 (1929) (although there was in fact a fence erected); Fisher v. Bennehoff, 121 Ill. 426,
13 N.E. 150 (1887); Joyce v. Williams, 26 Mich. 331 (1873); Kincaid v. Dormey, 47 Mo.
337 (1871); Welch v. Carter, 151 S.C. 145, 148 S.E. 697 (1929).
189 Needham v. Collamer, 94 Cal. App. (2d) 609, 211 P. (2d) 308 (1949).
190 Osteen v. Wynn, 131 Ga. 209, 62 S.E. 37 (1908).
101 Patton v. Smith, 171 Mo. 231, 71 S.W. 187 (1902).
192Young v. Blakeman, 153 Cal. 477, 95 P. 888 (1908).
193 Hoyer v. Edwards, 182 Ark. 624, 32 S.W. (2d) 812 (1930); Edgeller v. Johnston,
74 Idaho 359, 262 P. (2d) 1006 (1953); Kandlick v. Hudek, 365 Ill. 292, 6 N.E. (2d) 824
(1937).
194 Marchant v. Felder, 107 S.C. 516, 93 S.E. 179 (1917).
195 Renwick v. Noggle, 247 Mich. 150, 225 N.W. 535 (1929).
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process. Other stories could be told which would carry you to the
outer reaches of limbo. Such would be the record of the efforts of
individual courts to thread through the maze of available precedents, compounding the confusion as they went. The trouble is
that the courts have not been fully aware of what they are trying
to accomplish, although they have often been aware of the problem in our conveyancing practice which makes the search for a
solution imperative. We have seen the courts toil with agreements
that are not essentially promissory, with a vague and variable
concept of acquiescence, and with an uneasy kind of estoppel
that at best copes with only a fringe of the problem.
What then is the problem? It has been mentioned before. It
is the gulf in our conveyancing between descriptions in deeds
and boundaries on the ground. It is the impossibility by existing
methods of so describing land that competent persons can, by
using that description, be reasonably certain of locating its exact
boundaries. This much has been understood. The California
court has put it this way:
"If the position of the line always remained to be ascertained
by measurement alone, the result would be that it would not
be a fixed boundary, but would be subject to change with
every new measurement. Such uncertainty and instability in
the title to land would be intolerable." 196

In an early Kentucky case the court answered an argument that
proof of marked lines would amount to varying the record by
parol proof, saying:
"This would be true, if where a line is described by its course
only, a mathematical line . . . either according to the true
meridian or the magnetic variation were intended; but it is
apprehended that this is a misconception of the true meaning
of such a description of boundary. Such a line was never
run in making any survey, and is impossible to be ascertained
with perfect precision and certainty by any human means." 197
What then is to be done? It would be best simply to prevent
the problem from arising by so conveying land that no hiatus
would occur between the execution of a deed and the application
of the boundaries described to the ground. The feasibility of such
an expedient is considered in the succeeding section. How can
196Young v. Blakeman, 153 Cal. 477 at 481, 95 P. 888 (1908).
197 Cowen v. Fauntleroy, 2 Bibb (Ky.) 261 (1810).
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the gap be bridged in the case of existing titles? If there is no
certain application of a description to the ground, the much-sought
"true" line is a myth. If a court rules in favor of a line on the
ground, it becomes the boundary, not because the true line has
necessarily been found, but because the parties are left no other
choice. Controversy here, as elsewhere, must come to an end.
Our objective, therefore, should not be to discover better means of
locating the true line, but to discover a process for running a
line by one so authorized that his action will be conclusive. Boundary litigation of-course is such a process. But the rules discussed
herein have been evolved largely for the purpose of avoiding
litigation of every boundary question. Except where conflicting
titles are involved, the problem is not adversary in nature, and
the process of solving it should not be forced int6 an adversary
form. The process is essentially administrative or ministerial.
Someone should simply be authorized to apply the description
to the ground. Call it a determination of fact if you wish. Justice
Cooley must have had some such idea in mind when he uttered
his dictum on this problem, which was quoted above. 198
At any rate the authority conferred to locate some line would
not be authority to locate any line, but would at least require a
reasonable effort to apply the description and other relevant
data to the ground. This would imply the need for standards
or safeguards to insure that this was done. But once done within
the standards imposed, it would be conclusive, or as close to being
conclusive as any administrative determination can be. At least
it would not be subject to attack simply because someone else,
proceeding similarly at a later date, reached a different result.
It would also be necessary that a line so run be appropriately
marked or monumented, for if we are left with only an imaginary
line, we are no better off than we were to begin with. There are,
therefore, two essential ingredients for practical location: (1) an
application of a description to the ground by one competent to
do so, and (2) an appropriate marking of lines so run.
A possible explanation for the failure of courts explicitly to
reach the core of practical location may be the impossibility of
expressing its meaning except in terms that seem paradoxical. We
insist on the guiding force of the muniments of title, and yet that
we must cut free of them. We say, on the one hand, that the only
true guide for a practical location is in the applicable muniments
198 See

note 170 et seq. supra.
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of title. But once made, we say that the muniments of title have
fully performed their office and must thereafter remain in the
background, not to be later resurrected to impeach the operation.
If this process is administrative, it would seem to follow that it
should be performed by an administrator. Whether some such
procedure could be devised as to be effective upon the existing
state of titles is another question reserved for discussion below.
No such procedure, at any rate, is generally available today. The
point to be made here is that the suggested analysis may be used
to characterize much of the practical location of boundaries as
this has been accomplished under the rules previously considered.
When the courts apply their rules relating to boundary agreements or acquiescence, are they not really allowing the interested
parties themselves to undertake the administrative process of applying their titles to the ground? In this view, practical location
should not be explained in either contractual or conveyancing
terms, and some meaning is supplied to the conclusion previously
made that boundary agreements are essentially sui generis. If the
courts approached the problem in this way, they might avoid the
confusion which has resulted from their attempts to adapt concepts
which are inadequate. It is on this basis that "practical location"
has been used throughout this article as a generic term to cover
the several approved methods for the determination of boundaries. It is the only term in existing usage which carries the real
meaning of this process. The Minnesota court, it may be noted,
has cast its rules in the framework of this terminology.199
Until some more satisfactory method of practical location has
been provided, the courts must work with the rules they have. It is
desirable, therefore, briefly to examine those rules again to determine the extent to which they may be explained in terms of
the theory of practical location offered here and whether the
various features of those rules are consistent with the objectives
of that theory.

Parol Agreements
Except in the arbitration-type of case, where the usual principles of arbitration alone may suffice, boundary "agreements"
should be regarded simply as practical locations by the mutual
199 Beardsley v. Crane, 52 Minn. 537, 54 N.W. 740 (1893). The court said that practical location may take three forms: (1) acquiescence for the statutory period, (2) agreement afterwards acquiesced in, and (3) estoppel.
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assent of the parties affected. It should be possible to manifest
such assent formally or informally, expressly or impliedly, by
words or other conduct. In most of the cases the line agreed on
has been marked by fences and the like or other monuments,
but the courts have not often insisted on this as a requirement.
Mutual possession according to the line has often been found
sufficient. Physical marking of a line on the ground is of the essence of practical location, and the security of the operation calls
for the requirement of some sort of physical marking. It should
not be necessary that the line be marked before or concurrently
with the parties' expression of assent to it. They should be able
to assent to a line previously marked for some other purpose.
The cases require that parties shall not, in the guise of a
boundary agreement, attempt a parol transfer of land. Although
we may wish to avoid contractual or conveyancing concepts,
this requirement of the Statute of Frauds, under any theory of
practical location, can scarcely be avoided. If the argument is
made that any practical location which departs from the "true"
line is in effect a conveyance, the answer, of course, lies in the
unreality of any true line which has not yet been located. A
proper practical location is not essentially a conveyance, but it
is obvious that a conveyance can be made in the guise of a practical location. Hence the requirement of due respect for the relevant documents of title. If a line is to be deemed located by
the parties' assent to it, should they be required to act only on
the basis of an acceptable survey? This would tend to insure
against a deliberate· attempt to disregard the line described in
their deeds, as well as against a haphazard and careless operation.
In many cases this procedure was followed, but the courts have
shown no inclination to require it. Can the parties' interest in
protecting the integrity of their respective titles when they manifest their mutual assent to a boundary be relied on as an adequate
substitute for the standards which would otherwise be required
in such a procedure? Perhaps it can, but only within limits that
would guard against their deliberate attempt to change their
boundary. It may not be possible to define a general test for tliis
purpose, but particular criteria may be available. It could be
held, for example, that the parties exceeded their authority where
they located a line in the face of another obvious line, previously
located, or located one which was in obvious conflict with their
documents of title. Within such limits, their good faith may be
the only test. Putting the requirement in terms of doubt or un-
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certainty over the true line as a basis for agreement is likely to
prove more confusing than helpful.
It is in connection with the reliability of the parties' conduct
that the post-agreement requirements which the courts have
imposed become significant. Presumably they are imposed to
guard against hasty and ill-considered action. It is clear that, with
but a few possible exceptions, the courts will not allow a boundary
to be determined merely by a verbal manifestation of the parties'
assent to it. Most courts require subsequent acquiescence in the
line located or assented to, either for the period of the statute
of limitations or some indefinite period which may be less than
the statutory period. This surely provides a reliable safeguard,
for it allows ample opportunity for the discovery of error, as
well as for either party simply to change his mind. It is especially
indicated where assent has been given to a line previously marked.
What about the more liberal rule of some courts which requires
merely that an agreement be "executed"? For a reason previously
mentioned, it may not be enough to allow a practical location
to be consummated merely by acts of possession, although some
courts have held this sufficient. Suppose execution is held to
require merely the physical marking of the line. Maybe this
should be enough. While statements of parties as to their boundary may not be reliable, and are subject to misunderstanding,
it may be assumed that they will not lightly erect barriers or
other monuments which normally signify the limits of ownership.
But a party should be free to prove that a fence was built for
some other purpose than to mark a boundary. Whether the erection of a fence should raise a presumption of an intention to make
a practical location is a debatable question, the answer to which
may depend on how highly a court regards the policy favoring
practical location. To be significant for any purpose, physical
markings of a line must be mutual, which means either that
both parties must participate, or that the acts must be performed
by one with the provable assent of the other. It is at this point
that the outcome of litigation will depend less on proper legal
analysis than on a careful weighing of the variable facts of particular cases.
The assumption that a mutual manifestation of assent to
a line may be a reliable substitute for an administrative location
of a boundary meets its acid test in the mistake rule which has
been so often asserted by the courts. We have seen in the better
reasoned cases that the courts will not in every instance listen
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to an argument that a mistake was made in running a line on
the ground. Where a boundary is located by the judgment of a
court, it is not later subject to collateral attack on such a ground.
Nor presumably would it be so if it were located by an administrator acting under authority conferred by law. Nor should it
be so in the arbitration-type of case where it is located under authority conferred in advance by the parties themselves. But what
about the typical case in which a surveyor is authorized to run
a line, but without authority to bind the parties, whose assent
to the line comes after it has been run? Paraphrasing the argument sometimes made by courts, can the parties be held to have
fixed a boundary when their only purpose was to find it? The
answer is obvious, but the question is not fair. If all that has taken
place is a survey, this is not or should not be a practical location,
even if the parties thereafter verbally assent to it as showing the
boundary. Practical location takes place when the parties execute
their agreement upon the line as a boundary by physical markings or acquiescence or both. It may be argued that if we are
to regard such action as a substitute for a practical location by
an arbitrator or a court or an administrator, it should appear
that they intended so to act. But such intention need not be
explicit. It should be enough if they then regarded the location
of their boundary as settled and not conditional upon some future
determination by someone else. There is no justification for
implying any such conditional attitude on the basis of a later
assertion that the "true" line was somewhere else. This is especially so where their initial conduct has been followed by a
required period of acquiescence. The only realistic significance
that an allegation of mistake can have is that the parties would
not have acted if they had known the surveyed line was erroneous. But neither would a court or an administrator acting for
them in a proceeding initiated by them. In this sense, the argument rests on the illusion of the existence of some "true" line
which can always and certainly be found if properly sought. The
mistake rule in effect comes down to denying that the parties can
do for themselves what others can do for them. Whether the
parties can be relied on fully to guard their respective interests
when they manifest their assent to a boundary, whether such
assent is a good substitute for the safeguards that would be provided in a judicial or administrative operation, may be a debatable question. But the question should be faced in these terms.
If the announced policy in favor of the informal and extra-
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judicial resolution of boundary problems is strong enough to
require an affirmative answer, there is no room left for any question of mistake. It is significant that mistake has not been held
to be material where the parties, without a survey, or to avoid a
survey, undertake to set their boundary. But such a practical
location seems less teliable and less worthy of legal recognition
than the more common case where the parties act only after
an attempt has been made in good faith to apply their paper
titles to the ground.
The mistake rule may have been derived in part from the
contractual theory of practical location, with its implicit requirement of consideration, which is satisfied only by something like
an express submission to arbitration. This merely demonstrates
the inadequacy of contractual concepts in attaining the real objectives of practical location, for it removes from the compass
of that doctrine those cases which most deserve to be included
within it. Within its proper framework, any thought of a bargain
or of consideration is irrelevant.
If the analysis of practical location offered herein is valid,
the courts are not so wide of the mark when they say that the
effect of a valid boundary agreement is not to transfer land informally, but is only to fix the location where the estate of each
party is supposed to exist, so that they continue to hold the areas
agreed on by their existing titles.

Acquiescence
If it can be misleading to speak of practical location in contractual terms, it can be equally misleading to speak of acquiescence merely as evidence of an agreement. But we probably have
to recognize at least two kinds of practical location. In the one
case the mutual manifestation of assent to a line on the ground
as a boundary appears in something of the guise of a transaction,
identifiable in point of time. This is the one sense in which it
is like an agreement. Here we may well speak of acquiescence
as the passive conduct which some courts say must follow. If,
on the other hand, the required manifestation of assent does
not appear in this form, but appears only in a blend of active
and passive conduct over a period of time, it may not be amiss
to speak of such circumstances as a practical location by acquiescence. Indeed, it would be preferable to confine the term "boundary by acquiescence" to cases of the latter type. In any event, these
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two kinds of cases should be separately identified so that the differences between them can be understood.
In the absence of proof of acquiescence of the first type men·tioned above, the objective facts in an acquiescence case will
often be of equivocal significance. Where a fence or other barrier
has existed throughout the required period of time, with perhaps no proof of the circumstances of its origin, but without
proof of conduct by the parties on either side of it inconsistent
with its acceptance as a boundary monument, it may be permissible to infer or presume that the erection and preservation of
the fence was with assent to or in recognition of it as a boundary.
Either party would have leave to rebut such a presumption,
such as by evidence that the fence was intended to serve a different purpose, or that he did not believe that it marked the
true line. The same result, of course, would be indicated where
a fence has been erected by one party and treated by him as a
boundary, but without any manifestation of the other party's
position except his possession in conformity to it.
Where acquiescence merely consummates an othenvise provable practical location, the normal requirements of the latter
will, of course, be applicable. Mistake should be immaterial, the
line should be marked on the ground, and the parties should not
be allowed to change their boundary in the guise of a practical
location. No reason is seen for not imposing the same requirements where practical location is by acquiescence in the second
sense mentioned above. For example, to determine a boundary
by acquiescence in a fence which either party knew was not located on the true line would provide a means of altering a boundary, and so in effect of conveying land, informally. The courts
in fact have not made much use of the mistake rule where they
have chosen to speak of practical location in terms of acquiescence. But neither have they imposed a requirement of marking
the boundary. And there is doubt about how generally they will
insist upon their requirement of "doubt" or "uncertainty" about
the true line. Explanation for this may again lie in some of the
current notions of acquiescence as a kind of prescription. This
is a rationale quite different from practical location as that term
is used herein, which is keyed to the application of a written description to the ground. A prescriptive location of a boundary, on
the other hand, is essentially the abrogation of a paper title. In
this view, therefore, absence of certain of the requirements for
practical location becomes immaterial.
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We are left with the question, however, whether there is a
need for a more liberal doctrine of prescription. It is clear that
the courts are not content to remain within the confines of adverse possession. But it may be doubted that three doctrines are
required for the adequate solution of this kind of problem. Certainly less confusion would arise if we used only two. Under
this view, the courts would either require proof of adverse possession or confine the parties within the essential limits of practical
location.
Use of the period of the statute of limitations as the period
required for acquiescence has the advantage of simplicity. But
this period varies among the states from five to twenty-one years.
If the one period seems too short or the other too long, there is
an alternative which has received judicial recognition: an indefinite period, the length of which can be made to depend on
the nature of the proof of acquiescence in the particular case. It
may be noted that most courts prefer the indefinite period for
acquiescence as a post-agreement requirement and the definite
period where the boundary, as we may say, is located by acquiescence alone. This is not unreasonable.

Estoppel
There is no need to resort to estoppel to explain an ordinary
practical location. Most of the cases, however, involve facts to
which both doctrines may be relevant. This is most obviously the
case where the usual elements of practical location are present,
but in addition one party has substantially changed his position
in conformity to the line located. In the case where one party
changes his position in reliance on representations, by word or
conduct, of his neighbor, the ordinary elements of practical location are not obvious. But may not even this pattern of behavior
in fact manifest the mutual assent required for practical location? The making of improvements should be the best sort of
evidence of at least one party's assent. In any case, however, such
a change of position raises an equity in favor of the party making
it which is not present in every practical location. Whether or
not this meets the typical requirements of estoppel, whether or
not the opposing party, for example, labored under a bona fide
but mistaken belief as to the boundary, the courts hold that this
equity is controlling. It would be difficult to contend against this
view. Other features of practical location then assume less importance. In this situation, any requirement that a line be marked
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or that the parties cannot ignore an established boundary need
not be imposed.
Where then the elements of practical location are present,
but are fortified by a change of position, the result may be described in terms of either doctrine. Or the term "estoppel" might
be reserved for convenience to those cases where the usual elements of practical location are absent.

Description v. Survey-An Addendum
A few further comments are in order on several rules, previously considered herein and in an earlier article, all of which
in effect provide that a line established by a survey prior to a
conveyance becomes, as a matter of construction, the line called
for by the deed, notwithstanding a conflict between them. This
is practical location in reverse. In some courts' view, it is not
practical location at all, presumably because a line cannot be
located which does not yet exist. But no substantial reason is
seen why a line may not be located before as well as after a conveyance which purports to describe it. An ordinary practical
location presupposes a good faith attempt to locate a line previously described. An application of the present rules should
require a good faith attempt to describe a line previously located.
Such a requirement may have been assumed in the adoption of
these rules, but in stating them the courts often fail to require
that the line be marked on the ground or that protection be
afforded to subsequent purchasers without knowledge of the
line, not to speak of the failure to specify that the location of the
line be the mutual act of both the original parties. A rule so
stated fails to provide even the minimal requirements of practical
location. Many of the cases, however, show that such requirements were in fact met. In some of them, for example, there was
acquiescence in a marked line. In all of these cases the parties
to the transaction are grantor and grantee, who are left with a
common boundary. Since the conveyance follows the location of
the line, the grantee often accepts his deed in reliance on the
line run on the ground, and sometimes follows this by making
improvements. In such a case the doctrine of estoppel as it has
been developed in the practical location cases may be invoked.
It would be preferable, therefore, if the courts would simply
adapt the principles of practical location or estoppel to these
special circumstances, and cease trying to explain their decisions
in terms of these inadequate and misleading rules. The existence
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of these rules further reflects the failure of courts to perceive the
essential nature and ingredients of practical location.
It has been recognized that where a deed fails to describe the
line which was run, the remedy of reformation of the deed may
be appropriate. Certainly there are cases in which this would
be the best remedy. But to try to explain all of the cases in such
terms is again to make the assumption that a boundary can always
be described so as to indicate its exact location on the ground.
This of course is the root of the problem which the principles
of practical location were designed to overcome. There is some
sense, therefore, in treating the problem in most circumstances
as one of construction, controlled by the practical construction
provided by the parties.
VII.

THE LESSON OF PRACTICAL LOCATION

Although the existing rules of practical location can probably
be brought into such order that they can alleviate the deficiencies
of our conveyancing practices, they still will leave much to be
desired in providing for landowners who seek to know with certainty their boundaries. This article has been pointing to the
discovery of some better means of reaching this objective.
I should say to begin with that I know of no panacea. But I
am prepared to suggest a few remedies, the effectiveness of which
will depend on the extent to which they overcome the inertia
of existing practices and procedures.
The ideal solution would be to preclude discrepancies between descriptions in deeds and boundaries on the ground by
appropriate conveyancing practices. It may seem to some that
this could be accomplished by devising better methods of describing land. Some specific suggestions of this sort have been made.200
There is another alternative: do not try to describe land at all.
Or rather, use a description to identify land in a general way,
and fix the boundaries by specific reference in the description
to lines marked on the ground. This is not a novel idea. It is the
established practice in conveying government-survey land. The
trouble with that method is that the government survey was not
marked beyond sections and major fractions thereof, and many
of the monuments have long since disappeared. Authority should

200 Keith, "Government Land Surveys and Related Problems," 38 IowA L. REV. 86
(1952).
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be conferred by statute to survey and adequately mark any parcel,
however small. Indeed the smaller the parcel the more practicable such a method becomes.201 An official surveyor could be
provided for this purpose, or authority could be conferred on
any competent surveyor chosen by a grantor. In either case the ,
surveyor would be required to mark the land intended for conveyance by placing at designated intervals distinctive, official
monuments. He might be required to file in an appropriate office
any maps or field notes prepared by him. But the deed of such
land would conclude with the words, "according to official survey thereof," or the like. It could be made a misdemeanor for
anyone to disturb monuments so planted.
Such a procedure would bind grantor and grantee and their
privies, but it could not determine boundaries against the claims
of their non-participating neighbors. This is the principal limitation on the usefulness of such a device. But the present proposal
could be given effect without this difficulty in respect to the internal boundaries of divided land holdings. It would be most appropriate where land is platted and subdivided, and where much
of the proposed procedure is now followed. Those courts which
hold, in the case of platted land, that the survey controls the plat,
but without the safeguards suggested here, are making an abortive
effort to reach the proposed objective.
There is some question about the extent to which this procedure could be made compulsory. There would be no little difficulty in getting it adopted as a requirement for all conveyances
by which land is divided or subdivided. It might most hopefully
be proposed as an addition to the usual administrative requirements for platting land. Anyone at all familiar with the cases on
practical location by the parties will be inclined to favor a considerable degree of compulsion in the institution of a less haphazard procedure. But even if its use were left entirely voluntary,
some improvement in the condition of boundaries might be noted
in time.
The practical location of existing boundaries presents a larger
and more difficult problem. But it could be approached in much
the same way. Any landowner should be able to locate his boundaries by some simple, inexpensive, and expeditious means, and
to know that the boundaries so located cannot thereafter be im201 By the same token, the larger the tract, the more difficult become the problems
in using such a method. But we are not dealing with panaceas, and the small tracts
outnumber the large.
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peached. He should be able to call upon a surveyor who is authorized to perform this task on the basis of the appropriate muniments of title and to mark the boundaries so located by official
monuments. Provision for notice to other landowners affected
by this process would have to be made unless they participated in
initiating it. The surveyor probably would have to certify to what
he had done and file his records of the operation. The location of
a boundary could become conclusive upon the filing of the certificate if the interested parties joined in executing it, or it could
become conclusive after the lapse of a specified period if no objections were filed within that period. If any objections were
properly registered, this could have the effect simply of abrogating
the results, but preferably would be the foundation for judicial
review, in which presumably the survey would at least be prima
facie evidence of the boundaries sought. In the event a conflict of
titles developed, a judicial proceeding, of course, would be the
only solution. Once the boundaries of a parcel were established,
and in the absence of a conflict of titles, the owner could convey
it by its existing description. It would be preferable, however, as
in the case where a grantor and grantee are the only parties interested, that a later description be couched in terms of the official
survey. It would be even more preferable to require that this be
done.
This proposal too is not novel. There are statutes in several
states which, in varying degrees, provide such an administrative
procedure.202 No attempt will be made here to explain or compare
them or to evaluate their particular provisions. The Indiana
statute resembles most closely the present proposal. The Oregon
statute is patently inadequate. Nor has any investigation been
made to learn how much they have been used and to what effect.
There are relatively few cases in Indiana on practical location
by the parties, but it is not known whether the statutory procedure has had anything to do with this. In Indiana and Oregon
the statutory procedure has not been regarded as exclusive,203 and
in Louisiana boundaries have been located by estoppel.204
We may suspect that it would take more than a legislative
202 Ind. Stat. Ann. (Bums, 1951) §§49-3311 to 49-3314; La. Civ. Code (Dart, 1945) arts.
823 to 855; Ore. Rev. Stat. (1955) §§209.160 to 209.180. Cf. ID. Stat. (1957) c. 133, §11 et
seq.; Ky. Rev. Stat. (1956) §73.190 et seq.
203 Adams v. Betz, 167 Ind. 161, 78 -N.E. 649 (1906); Horton v. Brown, 130 Ind. 113,
29 N.E. 414 (1891); McCully v. Heaverne, 82 Ore. 650, 160 P. 1166 (1917).
204 Harper v. Learned, 199 La. 398, 6 S. (2d) 326 (1942); Selfe v. Travis, (La. App. 1947)
29 S. (2d) 786.
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enactment to initiate any widespread use of an administrative
procedure for locating boundaries. The inertia of habitual attitudes
and practices may suggest the need for some special inducement.
A provision might be included withdrawing from use all or part
of the rules relating to practical location by the parties, on the
ground that if a better method is available it ought to be exclusive.
Short of an administrative method of practical location, legislation might be considered which would reduce practical location
by the parties to the simplest possible operation consistent with
its reliability. It ~ight be provided that all such practical locations
be based on a survey by a competent surveyor, which, if accepted
by the parties, should be marked by distinctive monuments authorized for the purpose. The necessity would remain. for proof
that such marking was done by both parties or with their consent.
In the absence of bad faith, it might be necessary to preclude any
later claim that such a mutual marking was not consistent with
the survey on which it was based. A requirement of acquiesence
in such a boundary for a prescribed period might be imposed,
although this does not seem indispensable.
Under the latter proposal it may be doubted whether any
room would be left for a separate doctrine of "boundaries by
acquiescence." Consideration would then have to be given to
the need for such a doctrine.
These proposals are offered with some diffidence and without
any effort to spell out all the necessary features of any comprehensive and efficient legislative enactment. Nor is it assumed that
legislation of this sort would solve all boundary problems. It is
hoped merely that the need for improvement in present practices
has been demonstrated and that there are those who will rise to
meet it. It is hoped that, under appropriate auspices, a study of
this problem by title lawyers, surveyors, and other interested
persons, will somewhere and somehow be undertaken. We lawyers
have too long assumed that this was a matter of concern only to
surveyors until a dispute arises. We have too long washed our
hands of it in our title opinions by telling our clients that their
boundaries are a matter on which they must satisfy themselves,
knowing full well that they probably will do nothing at all unless
compelled by other interested parties, or that such satisfaction
as they may gain will likely prove illusory. Surely we can bring
our conveyancing practices into such order that we can escape
the reproach that a man cannot know his boundaries.

